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 As the economic disparity between coastal and interior regions widens at 
an increasing rate, China’s central government has initiated a Western 
development plan aimed at alleviating increasing economic and social disparity.  
In promoting coastal growth during the 1980’s and 1990’s, the central 
government believed that such growth would slowly diffuse westward.1  The 
logic was that the coastal region would develop first and transfer technology and 
knowledge inland while simultaneously integrating the Chinese economy with 
other East Asian economies.  Once the coastal economy became advanced and 
capital intensive, the need for resources, labor, and local market demand was 
predicted to be complemented by the western regions.  There is an earnest belief 
that development is contagious, and once several booming economic centers 
were supported, the rest of the nation would benefit by proxy.     
 Yet there is a different reality that undermines this belief.  The Chinese 
economy is mired by local protectionism while the development trajectory of several 
coastal cities is incomparably greater than its western counterparts.  Seven years after 
Beijing’s promulgation of the “Go West” policies, vast government investment has 
not translated into significant equalization gains.   There has been no dearth of central 
effort to alleviate inter-regional economic disparity, with widening regional disparity 
feared to hamper the creation of a national common market and threaten the 
                                                 
1 China's western region includes 10 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions: Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Xizang. The region 
covers 5.38 million square kilometers, 56% of the country land area, and has a population of 287 
million people, 22.99% of the national total.  From Yeung and Shen’s Developing China’s West.  
Hong Kong: Chinese University Press (2004).   
  Park - 6 
 6 
government’s most valued mandate of social stability.  Clearly there is a flaw in the 
logic of western development.       
 Internationally, China’s economic integration with East Asia is a 
relatively nascent occurrence since the imperial era.  China’s admission into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) stamps its official entry into a wider global 
market.  It is widely recognized by policymakers in Beijing that before China 
can become a dominant force in the international economy it must first 
consolidate a domestic market that is fragmented by local protectionism.  Market 
fragmentation refers to the partitions erected by local governments that use 
administrative controls to block the inflow of resources from other areas and 
limit the outflow of local resources to outside regions.2  Since membership rules 
for the WTO stipulate that the central government is responsible for any trade 
violations of local governments, Beijing is legally accountable for the difficulties 
foreign companies may have accessing the economy with the possibility of 
incurring sanctions.  Domestically, local protectionism often leads to trade wars 
that reduce competitiveness of Chinese enterprises in general.3  Local 
protectionism, an unwanted offspring of economic reforms, is bolstered by the 
formation of regional urban networks that threaten to undermine the central 
government’s control over macroeconomic policy.  Contrary to official regional 
denominations, however, I argue against conceptualizing the region as a 
                                                 
2 This is the definition used by the State Development Planning Commission in Yin Wen-quan, 
“Causes for China’s Local Market Fragmentation,”  China & World Economy, 6 (2001). 
3 One example in the automobile industry is in 2000, Shanghai imposed an 80,000 yuan license fee for 
Hubei Province-originated Fukang autos (the auto fee for Shanghai cars were only 20,000 yuan).  In 
return, Hubei Province ordered all institutes and departments that received national funds to opt to buy 
the local Fukang autos or make a 70,000 yuan extra “contribution” to the “Enterprise Poverty Relief 
Fund.”  Regional Protectionism Weakening State Capacity.  China.org.cn  March, 2001.   
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collective body of provinces with mutual interests and instead as fragmented 
networks of capital production and accumulation with amphibious boundaries.4   
 The question that emerges is why, despite serious central government attempts 
at national integration, do we see a trend of informal micro-regionalism occurring in 
China?  I propose that this failure is due to the rise of inter-provincial and 
transnational urban networks along the coastal and border areas of China.  The 
linking of urban areas across East Asia and China is a self-serving process that keeps 
wealth concentrated, compartmentalized, and contained within networks.  The 
concept of urban networks have long been present in sociology and urbanization 
studies, but have yet to be translated into the realm of political science.  These urban 
networks are serious threats to central control due to their lack of regulation by the 
central government.  I will show that because their growth is largely the result of 
informal domestic and global forces, there is a pressing need to reconfigure our 
conceptualization of spatiality and governance in China.  There are three forms of 
regionalism to emerge from the reform era: central projects, inter-provincial 
cooperation, and informal urban networks.  The one the center has least control of is 
the one that is most integrated outside of its authority: informal urban networks.  This 
thesis will show that these informal urban networks present a formidable obstacle 
blocking Beijing’s attempt to create a common market due to its nature as a bottom-
up process of regionalization, central government cessation of economic control, and 
                                                 
4 “Amphibious” in this regard is borrowed from XL Ding’s coining of “institutional amphibiousness” 
in state-society relations.  The idea that the boundary separating two entities can have ambiguous 
demarcations as the institutions within each are intertwined and mutually manipulative.  In my 
definition regional boundaries are amphibious due to their indeterminate adherence to both the limits 
of political jurisdiction and to the flows of capital between cities.  See X.L. Ding’s “Institutional 
Amphibiousness and the Transition from Communism: The Case of China.” British Journal of 
Political Science 24 (1994) 293-318. 
  Park - 8 
 8 
the network’s deep international linkages and foreign support.  Informal urban 
networks have come into being by central policy but have become part of provincial 
coping strategies to advance local economic interests ahead of central policy.  
Broadly speaking, I am arguing for micro-regions as critical level of analysis due to 
their potential to integrate or further fragment the national economy.5   
 
Organization of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into five chapters.  The first chapter argues for the 
rescaling of state spaces and the importance of cities and regions as critical levels of 
analysis before introducing a theoretical conceptualization for urban networks.  The 
subsequent chapters are devoted to case studies that test and expand my model.  Each 
case has had vastly different histories and factor endowments, yet all exhibit the same 
trend toward network formation.  Case studies in Guangdong, Yunnan provinces and 
the Shanghai provincial municipality were selected to augment my framework with a 
different aspect.  The Guangzhou urban network was selected because it demonstrates 
intra-provincial disparity contained within a province.  The following Shanghai urban 
network highlights domestic inter-provincial linkages, and contrasts with Guangzhou 
because as a city with provincial status without much territory, it is strongly 
connected with its neighboring provinces.  The Kunming urban network highlights 
informal transnational network formation and the linking of micro-regions with sub-
                                                 
5 To clarify some terminology used throughout this paper, there is a difference between the 
usage of local in “central-local” relations and in “local” governments and localities.  Within 
“central-local” relations, local refers to provinces and provincial governments.  In the second 
case it refers to any substate actor or place below the central level, encompassing provinces, 
townships, and villages.     
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regions.  Each case study, while different in their aim, yields the same broad finding 
that development is a spatially biased and concentrated process.  The final chapter 
will extrapolate the significance of the rise of informal urban networks and their 
implications for governance.  I will conclude with several policy recommendations 
for the central government in their effort to integrate the national economy and 
alleviate economic disparity.   
The purpose of this thesis is to expose a bottom-up micro-regional process.  
The rise of informal urban networks between cities is made possible by the central 
government but fueled by non-state actors.  As will be discussed later, fiscal 
decentralization and economic reforms have created the conditions for cities to 
become key units of analysis in both international and domestic regional processes. 
Informal urban networks lack an overarching grand strategy from Beijing but instead 
are the result of an evolution of complementary economic functions between nearby 
cities combined with supportive local government policies.  As I will argue, these 
urban networks transgress national boundaries by linking across the entire East Asian 
region and constrain foreign policy behavior with their massive economic influence.  
Informal networks are, on one hand, beneficial as a source of growth and regional 
integration, and on the other hand, dangerous because they expand without the control 
of the central government.  Their economic interdependence with foreign economies 
compromise Beijing’s monopoly on foreign policy-decision making and with Chinese 
foreign policy being best characterized as pragmatic, informal networks provide 
endogenous pressure on Beijing’s foreign relations. 
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1.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The immediate challenge of developing models for China is the country’s 
immense size, heterogeneous peoples, languages, cultures and variety of factor 
endowments that make the simplification that accompanies model-building divorce 
theory from the complex spatial reality.  This thesis is not intended to be an 
exhaustive study of informal urban networks but rather to present a different approach 
for conceptualizing regionalism in China.  Rather than extensively develop a 
complete model for future research, the use of informal urban networks is intended to 
provide a framework for understanding the shortcomings of central government 
economic integration efforts.  The primary focus is on why informal urban networks 
are biased processes and not so much the how.   
 National and Provincial statistics are largely drawn from various years of the 
China Statistical Yearbook, with the latest available years at the time of writing being 
2003.  Due to my personal inadequacies in reading Chinese, the majority of my 
sources are from Western social scientists with the exception of translated works and 
government publications.  This inherent Western bias in my research has both its 
disadvantage of prejudiced perspective but also an advantage of carrying a different 
agenda than Chinese authors who may be predisposed to a foregone conclusion.  I am 
not exonerating Western sources from such dispositions but have found that in much 
of my study of economic geography there is a conscious attempt to separate politics 
and economics.  There is also a dearth of current research of economic geography in 
China when it is most relevant.  Around the time of Krugman’s Geography and Trade 
in 1991 that outlined a new economic geography, there was much research done on 
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China in this field.  I believe that this was the result of the enormous spatial 
reconfiguring that happened during the 1980s economic reforms that led to escalating 
economic disparities.  Also, due to its global importance, there is far more research 
available on Guangzhou and Shanghai than Yunnan. 
 My mapping of urban networks is far from complete and I cannot present an 
adequate quantitative analysis.  This is because of an incongruity of research done on 
each province and because I lack the required economic specialization to produce a 
convincing case for each urban network.  I accept that my designation of the cities in 
each urban network is open to debate, as can what is a core or peripheral city.  That 
being said, due to the inherent nature of the topic as a multidisciplinary subject, my 
analysis will not be particularly focused on one area but its strength is the 
incorporation of many.   
 
1.2 DEFINING THE REGION: COMPETING 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS 
 
The definition adopted in this paper of “regionalism” is what Dorothy 
Solinger broadly defines as, “the phenomenon whereby distinct groups, living in 
discrete territorial enclaves within larger political communities, exert pressures 
for recognition of their differences.”6 This concept of the region in China studies 
is much different than the official delineation of regions along provincial 
boundaries.  The Regional Analysis Framework (RAF) that was promulgated by 
                                                 
6 Dorothy Solinger. Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949-1954. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).  Solinger highlights the role of the southwest China 
regional government in actually aiding political integration and consolidating Communist power.  
Solinger notes that regional organs were highly effective in solving provincial economic problems 
such as the economic dislocation of 1949, and that there is no necessary connection between regional 
and central power.   
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Beijing in the Seventh Five Year Plan (1986-1990) has greatly shaped the way 
policymakers perceive regions.  The RAF demarcates China’s provinces into 
coastal, central, and interior regions and outlines different specialization and 
development strategies for each region.7  This grouping was composed to 
conform to the extents of administrative power held by the provincial 
governments with the aim of distinguishing which areas where rich and poor.  
Although abandoned in 1990, this framework can be useful in understanding the 
rationale behind provincial and central policies during the 1980’s economic 
reforms.  In studying economic reforms during this period, for instance, Dali 
Yang argues that different provinces from the coastal and interior regions often 
competed for preferential policies and special treatment from Beijing.8  The 
shortcomings of this framework is not only that is has become outdated, but that 
it is overly simplistic in its division of China.  Guangxi, for example, is one of 
the poorest provinces in China yet was classified as part of a Coastal region 
along with some of the richest provinces (and provincial-status cities) such as 
Guangdong and Shanghai.   
An important outgrowth of the RAF is the creation of three different 
types of regional networks: an inter-provincial network, a network of smaller 
economic zones linking provincial capitals, ports, cities along vital 
communication and transport lines, and a network of central cities.9  Of the three 
regional networks only one is a bottom-up process: the network of central cities.  
                                                 
7 “The Seventh Five-Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China for Economic and Social 
Development (1986-1990).’ Beijing Review 29, 17:28 April (1986).   
8 Dali Yang, Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997).   
9 David Goodman, China’s Regional Development (London: Routledge, 1989) 14-17 
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By bottom-up process, I mean that the network is initiated and fostered by local 
agents as opposed to central objectives.  The first two were established by the 
central government in order to either ensure consolidated control over important 
public goods (such as electricity and energy) between provinces or to attempt to 
alleviate economic disparities between the coast and the interior.10 These 
regional processes foster horizontal linkages that surpass provincial borders; a 
result intended by the central government in an attempt to improve efficiency by 
encouraging enterprises and local authorities to cooperate beyond provincial 
boundaries. 11  Regional bodies like the Shanxi Energy Base that links parts of 
Mongolia, Hebei, and Shanxi therefore have a unified purpose of energy 
production and are designed to advance national interests.  I classify them as top-
down and formal regional processes due to their instigation by the central 
government.   
In May 2004, the Development Research Center of the State Council released 
a report predicting the future of regional development, citing China’s rapidly 
increasing urbanization rate that is expected to jump from 39.1% in 2002 to 60% by 
2020.12  The Report claims that large-city spheres will become the leading force in 
economic development, with primary spheres forming at the Yangtze River Delta, 
Pearl River Delta, Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan, Shandong Peninsula, Shenyang-Dalian, 
and Chongqing-Chengdu.13  In each this regional model, a central city serves as the 
                                                 
10 Goodman (1989) Ibid.  
11 Terry Cannon. “Regions: Spatial Inequality and Regional Policy,” in Cannon and Jenkin’s The 
Geography of Contemporary China. London: Routledge, 1992.  54-59 
12 Li Shantong, Feng Jie & Hou Yongzhi.  Ten Major Trends for Regional Development in China.  
Development Research Center of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, May 2004.   
13 Shantong, Jie, Yongzhi (2004) Ibid. 
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nucleus, while surrounding smaller cities serve as industrial and economic 
complements.  As central cities shift their industrial production to the peripheral 
secondary cities, the report claims a rational system of division of labor and the 
optimally efficient allocation of resources will be realized.14 This city-sphere model is 
much akin to throwing a stone into a lake and expecting the ripple effect to disperse 
equally and in all directions.  In reality, this model is severely constrained by several 
factors such as territorial borders, geography, and provincial/local identities.  As I 
will show, the city-sphere argument makes a false assumption that urban development 
will initiate a contagion effect of economic growth to peripheral areas.   
In contrast, the informal urban networks that form micro-regions around 
key cities are fostered by local governments that have considerable influence in 
shaping micro-regions.  These urban sub-regions interlink due to shared 
recognition of mutual gains that are locally motivated and not demanded by the 
central state.15  An example of the development of an urban network is 
Guangzhou’s expansion as an economic region.  Natural gas exploration in the 
South China Sea coupled with industrial and technological coordination with 
nearby cities is intended to relieve pressure on Guangzhou and allow it to further 
develop tertiary economic enterprises and technology such as intensive light 
industries.16 In Guangzhou, for example, we see a devolution of functions to 
lesser cities while Guangzhou remains the nucleus in the expanding regional 
process. Guangzhou’s regionalization process, however, is not limited within 
China’s borders but links with Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as well.   
                                                 
14 Shantong, Jie, Yongzhi (2004) Ibid.  
15 Shantong, Jie, Yongzhi (2004) Ibid.  54-59. 
16 Yeung, Deng, Cheng (1992) Ibid. 259-261. 
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Due to the increasing importance of cities as main actors in China’s 
development strategy as well and rising exposure to global market forces, there 
is a pressing need to rescale spatiality to deal with conceptual incongruities 
between domestic internal political demarcation and economic transnationalism.  
If we divide the vertical governance structure into hierarchical levels of the 
central party-state, provincial governments, and local governments, regions 
would be the de facto level between Beijing and the provinces that has no 
corporeal manifestation (Figure 1).  To clarify, there is no political institution 
that represents regional interests within the state apparatus (hence the lack of 
boundaries on the pyramid).  The regionalization process studied in this paper is 
the rise of urban centers at the bottom level that exerts influence up the pyramid. 
 
 












             microregional informal urban networks 
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1.3 THE FAILURE OF FORMAL INTEGRATION 
PROJECTS 
 
One such example of a failed integration project is the Shanghai Economic 
Region that was designated during the 6th and 7th Five-Year Plans (1981-1990) to 
promote economic integration between the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, and Fujian.  The State Planning Office ordered the co-operative development 
of electricity and coal industries.  Shanghai even ended up investing billions of 
Renminbi into developing neighboring provinces’ raw material industries with the 
promise of supplies in return.17  Yet the Shanghai Economic Planning Office was shut 
down in 1988, just five years after its creation due to the lack of inter-provincial 
cooperation.  This failure of central government regional initiative is largely 
attributed to the lack of interest of richer provinces in helping to develop their poorer 
neighbors.18   
 In 2004, Guangdong Provincial Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang developed a 
Pan-Pearl River Delta cooperation scheme designed to dismantle trade barriers and 
build a common market among the provinces and special administrative regions of 
Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, the Guangxi 
Zhang Autonomous Region, Hong Kong, and Macao.19  These provinces account for 
47 percent of the Chinese economy and over half of its foreign trade.  Each province 
specializes according to this regional framework.  For example, Hong Kong is 
designated as the logistics and financial hub, Macao the gaming and trade services 
                                                 
17 Terry Cannon and Le-Yin Zhang.  “Inter-region tension and China’s reforms.” in Cook’s 
Fragmented Asia: Regional Integration and National Disintegration in Pacific Asia (Brookfield: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 1996) 78-80. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “Deal to Bring Down Delta’s Barriers to Trade.” China Daily: July 19 (2004).  
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center, and Guangdong as the manufacturing base.  In addition, the rapid 
development of transportation infrastructure as well as annual economic and trade 
forums was believed to contribute in breaking down trade barriers.   
 Although it is too soon to deem this project a failure, it has already come 
under criticism for failing to address the root of the problem.  An editorial attacked 
the project in the South China Morning Post just a year later, claiming that the 
development of transport links would have been done regardless of a formal 
government project.  It also argued that nothing had been done to solve the root 
problem of competing provincial interests.20  The vast economic disparity between 
the involved provinces means that dismantling barriers often means higher costs for 
poorer provinces.  Abolishing tolls, for instance, is much harder for a province that 
relies on tolls as a key source of revenue but not so much for Guangdong.  A year 
later, rich provinces still refuse to sacrifice more resources for less gain.  Without a 
change in incentives, formal government attempts at regional integration will have 
trouble succeeding.     
 In 1999, Beijing embarked on its largest regional project to date: the “Go 
West” plan to develop the Western regions.  According to government studies, 
through heavy government investment, it is expected that the West will enjoy the 
benefits of catch-up effects and grow at a faster rate than its Coastal counterparts, 
which in time will alleviate regional disparity.21 Government investment runs the 
gamut from industrial development to ecological protection, with Beijing planning to 
                                                 
20 Leu Siew Ying. “Nine plus two might make for a crowd.” South China Morning Post. September 23, 
2005. 
21 “Determinants of Regional Growth and Policy Implications.” Institute of World Economics and 
Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences  (2002).  
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invest more than 500 billion yuan (US$60.5 billion) in planting trees and restoring 
grasslands in its 12 western provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities by 
2010.22  China has already launched a series of projects attempting to link East and 
West, including an electricity transmission project, a pipeline for natural gas, highway 
construction, and the Qinghai-Tibet Railway project. It seems as though such major 
central projects have already yielded results, with each of the ten provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions in west China -- excluding Guizhou and Tibet 
-- logging economic expansion rates of more than 12 percent in the first half of 
2004.23 In terms of a national common market, the central government hopes that the 
western regions, rich in energy and mineral resources, will form complementary 
economic ties with the advanced, comparatively capital-intensive coastal region.24  
However, in 2004, The China Daily reported the frustration at the lack of 
improvement after five years since the initiation of the “Go West” policies in 1999.  
Widening regional disparity is feared to hamper the rise of domestic demand and 
threaten social stability.25 Although the west is rich in natural resources, spans almost 
three-fourths of the nation's territory and is home to one-fourth of its population, its 
gross domestic product (GDP) only accounts for only 40 percent of that of the 
booming eastern regions.26   
Therefore, we can identify three key reasons why government led economic 
integration projects have failed.  First, when they are intended to integrate rich and 
                                                 
22 According to Li Zibin, Vice-Minister of the State Development Planning Commission. More Funds 
to the West.  China Daily (November 13, 2002) http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/48657.htm 
23 Ibid.  
24 Xinhua News Agency (October 15, 2004)  http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/109486.htm 
25 “Narrowing Gap Between East and West.” China Daily July 7, 2004.  
http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/100590.htm 
26 Ibid. 
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poor provinces, rich provinces lack incentives to cooperate.  Second, such initiatives 
often are not planned around the optimal market allocation of resources, labor, and 
capital, and as such make little sense to local agents.  Finally, provincial governments 
often cannot coordinate cooperation between local governments; as a direct result 
inter-provincial coordination is difficult.  There is an underlying erroneous 
assumption that because coastal cities need resources and raw materials, they will 
forge marketing routes from inland provinces to sustain development, while at the 
same time create foreign linkages for overseas capital, foreign technologies, and 
management know-how.  
 
 
1.4 REGIONALISM, SUB-REGIONALISM, AND MICRO-
REGIONALISM 
 
The term “regionalism” is meaningless without clear definitions of the actors, 
scale, and processes involved.  When applied to interstate relations, regionalism can 
be viewed as a government response to the wider international system.27  From an 
economic perspective, states engage in regionalism in order to protect their global 
market share and increase their negotiating influence by forming coalitions with 
mutually interested neighbors.  In this case, regions can be an effective intermediary 
between states and the international economy.  Member states of The Association of 
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, often use the regional organization 
                                                 
27 Bjorn Hettne.  Theorising the Rise of Regionness.  New Political Economy (Nov. 2000) 457-472. 
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as a platform to negotiate trade issues with larger foreign economies.28  Unlike 
European integration, East Asia lacks governing regional institutions but instead 
relies on informal networks that facilitate interregional transactions and 
communication.29   
In opposition to arguments in globalization studies that supranational 
processes weaken state capability, Katzenstein argues that in East Asia, regional 
market integration is part of government strategy to stay embedded in markets in the 
face of a liberalizing world economy.30  Therefore in the case of East Asia, we can 
conceive of regionalism as an intermediary platform between global and local 
economy, with domestic governments having a vested interest in encouraging the 
economic linkages that bind the region together.  Globalization, the process which the 
International Monetary Fund defines as, “the growing economic interdependence of 
countries worldwide through increasing volume and variety of cross-border 
transactions in goods and services, freer international capital flows, and more rapid 
and widespread diffusion of technology”31 and regionalization, the process by which 
proximate countries becoming increasingly interdependent and integrated, are two 
concurrent phenomenon.  The “region” is an amorphous grouping of actors, yet we 
can firmly cement its position between the level of domestic and global.  For the sake 
of comparison, we can divide regions into macro-regions, sub-regions, and micro-
regions.  To avoid confusion, because my thesis is on urban networks as a form of 
                                                 
28 One recent example is the negotiation of bilateral free trade areas between ASEAN, China, and 
Japan.   
29 Keiichi Tsunekawa,  “Why so many maps there? Japan and regional cooperation,” in Pempel’s 
Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2005) 101-103 
30 Peter J. Katzenstein, “A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium” (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005) 80. 
31 IMF, World Economic Outlook (May 1997) 
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micro-regionalism, I distinguish between these three scales of regionalism by the 
number of cities involved.  A micro-region comprising of four or five cities, for 
example, can therefore be part of a greater sub and macro-region that involves more.  
Since my unit of analysis is the city, as a natural corollary my configuration of micro-
regions is based on cities.        
 
1.5  A HEURISTIC MARKET EXPLANATION 
 
 In general, why have formal integration projects supported by the central 
government failed?  I propose a basic market explanation for understanding why 
such attempts have failed.  The good in this case is inter-provincial economic 
integration, with the central government attempting to sell this good and 
localities as rational buyers making optimal choices whether or not to “buy” this 
good.  The distinction is not whether or not they agree to the arrangement, but 
whether they actively support integration.  Often such integration projects 
receive vocal support from localities but stagnate and ultimately fail due to a 
lack of implementation.  This chapter discusses the formation of this regionalist 
market where the central government and localities negotiate on the price of 
economic integration.  A market analysis is appropriate because the ontological 
significance of markets is not the actors of buyer and seller but rather the 
incentives that govern their interaction.  By understanding the choices localities 
make we can begin to understand why some have turned to informal urban 
networks and micro-regionalism as the preferred strategy for economic growth 
over inter-provincial cooperation and horizontal integration.   





 Informal urban networks are the offspring of economic reforms, and the 
market mechanism that allows for local choice over formal cooperation is a 
relatively nascent phenomenon.  During the Mao and pre-reform era, provincial 
and local governments were obsessed with implementing central policies and 
campaigns and local politics was so heavily ideologized that market incentives 
had little bearing on government policy.  After 1979, once economic growth 
became the focus of central policy and fiscal decentralization granted provinces 
prerogative over local development, provincial interests were given the means to 
make fairly autonomous decisions on horizontal integration with other provinces.  
Once provincial and local leaders were instructed to deliver economic growth, 
Chung (1998) claims that provincial actions became governed by economic logic, 
where provinces and localities, “have to rely on some economic logic suitable 
for the promotion of comparative advantages, competition, efficiency, and so on, 
as opposed to autarky, organizational dependence, equality, and so forth.”32   
 
Supply and Demand 
 
 The central government must decide what the price for integration is.  
Granting preferential policy means tax breaks and less revenue from the most 
                                                 
32 Jae-Ho Chung, “Study of Provincial Politics in the Post-Mao Reform Era,” in Cheung, Chung, and 
Lin’s Provincial Strategies of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) 
435. 
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productive localities.  There is a significant social cost that must be factored in 
as well.  In a Pew Poll released in 2002, 33 percent of Chinese respondents 
believed that the greatest global danger was the gap between rich and poor.33  
The center’s supply curve for economic integration is shaped by social costs and 
by the need for revenue.  Horizontal integration makes development of poorer 
provinces cheaper for Beijing since it is often other provinces that share the cost 
burden.   
Localities demand economic growth.  For local elites, high growth rates 
mean more opportunities for career advancement, and for local leaders the 
incentive is the same: to move up the political hierarchy.  Local demand curves 
are shaped by the costs of economic integration.  They are much more likely to 
accept economic integration with similarly endowed localities that can 




 The market model for economic integration has only one seller but many 
potential buyers.  The price, in this case, is the cost to localities.  Let us identify 
two potential buyers as B1 and B2.  B1 is an economically productive and well-
off locality.  B2, on the other hand, lacks an economic advantage and is 
                                                 
33 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.  Field data was compiled from July 20 – 
August 18, 2002, with the majority of respondents from urban areas from a sample of 3,000.  
Respondents were asked to rate the biggest global danger from a list of five choices: nuclear 
proliferation, religious and ethnic hatred, the AIDs epidemic and other diseases, and pollution and 
environmental problems.  Concern over the rich/poor gap was second with 33 percent, just behind 
pollution and environmental concerns at 34 percent.         
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comparatively worse-off.  Economic integration for B1 means that it will 
shoulder a greater share of the fiscal burden of completing regional 
infrastructure projects, and as a result it is less willing than B2 to accept formal 
government attempts to integrate.  B2 has its own share of concerns, as it will 
expose its local industries to increased competition and surrender valuable 
extrabudgetary revenues that they derive from tolls and various trade barriers.  
Yet at the same time they have more to gain from regional integration than a 
richer locality.                                               
  
 Therefore, richer localities are not as inclined as poorer ones to demand 
economic integration.  Unless the price is acceptable, localities will not pursue 
economic cooperation, especially if there is an alternative foreign alternative that 
promises greater returns.   
The following section shows how the reform era has created the 







Figure 2: Market for Economic Integration 
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central planning and the return of natural geography in affecting spatial 
development.  During the Mao era, development was the product of central 
directives that were influenced by security and ideological factors.  The second 
is the rise of urban governance, which places localities in the buyer’s role in 
determining whether or not to cooperate with central mandates to integrate.   The 
third is the dynamics of competitive liberalization that shapes the horizontal 
relationship between localities and how they compete with one another.   
 The logic of informal urban networks is inextricably tied with the 
domestic market for economic integration.  As this thesis will show, the gains of 
trade and network formation with other developed urban areas far exceed the 
gains of inter-provincial cooperation with poorer areas with less to offer.  The 
central government’s challenge is to create demand for regional integration as it 
is not a good that can be supplied.  As opposed to the view of regions as a sum 
of provincial administrative units, an accurate conceptualization begins with a 
delineation between the territorial jurisdiction of provinces and the flows of 
capital between fixed points of accumulation. These two do not always overlap, 
although capital flows may be constrained by trade regulations or tariffs.  
Therefore, government policy and capital flows are often mutually reinforcing as 
economic policy aims to expand capital flows while capital flows direct where 
the government needs to channel resources.  Fiscal federalism has transferred 
policy power down the vertical command structure from the center to the 
provincial and local governments, meaning that this flow of capital is less 
subject to an overarching national interest and more to local preference.  Despite 
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local protectionism, Beijing still retains a significant measure of control over the 
localities as provincial governments still operate within the political 
framework.34   
 
 
1.6 DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
PRECONDITIONS FOR INFORMAL URBAN 
NETWORKS 
 
 How did informal urban networks become so prominent in China? Since 
the initiation of economic reforms, there have been two major developments that 
have made urban networks possible: China’s integration with other East Asian 
economies and the domestic central-local compromise.  In an East Asian region 
divided by historical resentment and lacking in multilateral political institutions, 
cities have become central actors in linking regional economies.  Growth 
triangles between countries have formed investment corridors that take 
advantage of complementary economic functions, which in turn encourages the 
spread of production chains across national borders.  A few urban centers in East 
Asia such as Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo, and Seoul, serve as “the locus for 90 
percent of international finance, transportation, tradable manufacturing, and 
information” in the entire region.35  As a result, cities are critically important in 
understanding the informal linkages between nations that allow national 
                                                 
34 David Goodman highlights local lip service to the political framework when, in 1991-1992, 993 
foreign firms directly invested in Hangzhou City without central permission.  Their existence was only 
revealed, however, after Deng Xiaoping had publicly endorsed such actions during his Southern Tour 
in 1992.  David Goodman.  “The Politics of Regionalism,” in Goodman and Segal’s China 
Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism (London: Routledge, 1994) 15-16. 
35 Katzenstein.  A World of Regions: Asia and Euorpe in the American Imperium (2005) 189. 
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governments to enjoy the benefits of economic interaction without 
complementing it within a political framework.36 As I will show, informal urban 
networks serve as gateways that link local and foreign economies. 
 
The Importance of Rapprochement  
 
Informal urban networks have been made possible due to domestic 
reform and foreign rapprochement.  The normalization of relations between 
China and many of its neighbors was a fundamental pre-condition that gave 
urban networks access to foreign markets and made them recipients of foreign 
investment.  Illegal foreign trade was present before rapprochement, with many 
countries using Hong Kong as an intermediary.  The establishment of formal 
diplomatic and economic relations has greatly reduced transaction costs, as well 
as made greater regional cooperation possible.  Although Sino-Burmese trade 
began in 1984, it would not be until 1988 that relations would be normalized.  
China established formal relations with Laos and Vietnam in 1987 and 1989 
respectively, and it would not be until 1992 that China would normalize relations 
with South Korea.  In all of these cases, rapprochement occurred when it was 
blatantly obvious that trade was increasing despite formal linkages.  To use the 
case of South Korea as an illustration, Beijing needed to frequently denounce 
South Korea to reassure North Korea of their alliance.  Using Hong Kong as an 
intermediary, however, Chinese and South Korean trade steadily grew from a 
measly $19 million in 1979 to $8 billion by the time of rapprochement in 1992, 
                                                 
36 Katzenstein (2005) Ibid. 190. 
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all in the absence of formal linkages.37  By 1992, irrepressible informal 
economic trade made it quite clear that in accordance with China’s pursuit of 
economic growth, normalization of relations with South Korea was an inevitable 
development.  With South Korea being so close to China, it is no surprise that 
economic relations increased so rapidly that by 2001, South Korean investment 
in China exceeded investment in the United States with China reciprocally 
becoming the largest source of new foreign investment for South Korea.38  
While this attests to the power of informal linkages, on the other hand, the fact 
that it took so long also shows the deep historical enmity in East Asia that makes 
formal cooperation so difficult and hinders the realization of natural economic 
territories.  In East Asia, after the 1997 financial meltdown exposed both the 
interdependence of regional economies and the reliance on US-led international 
organizations like the IMF, nations began to openly embrace monetary 
regionalism as a preventative mechanism against future economic shocks.  
While Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was rejected by the 
United States, in 2001, 13 Asian states arranged for currency swaps among their 
central banks in an effort to increase shared access of foreign reserves.39  Strong 
economic linkages between major trading cities are now openly supported by 
national governments as East Asia exhibits an unmistakable trend toward future 
economic integration.        
                                                 
37 Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Washington D.C.: Hoover Press Publication, 
1996) 140-150. 
38 James Brooke. “Courtship of Beijing and Seoul” A New Twist for an Old Bond.” The New York 
Times, 3 Jan 2003: A12. 
39 Dieter Heribert. “Asia’s Monetary Regionalism.” Far Eastern Economic Review. Hong Kong, July 6, 
2000. Vol. 163, Iss. 27, 30. 
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The Domestic Central-Local Compromise 
 
Domestically, due to the sheer size of Chinese state, the central 
government has always faced exacerbated logistical and coordination problems 
with its localities compared to smaller polities.  As a result, the vertical state 
apparatus has been subject to repeated revision over the course of China’s long 
recorded history to finally craft a delicate balance between central and local 
authority.  Unlike previous imbalances of power, current central-local relations 
are in an unprecedented situation of compromise.  Previous oscillations in the 
pendular relationship between center and localities have tended to end tragically 
for China when power falls too far to one side.  On one hand an effective central 
government is needed to encourage cooperation, coordinate foreign policy, and 
balance local interests while on the other hand, localities need to be empowered 
in order to efficiently administer their territories and promote local interests.  
The main differences between China’s regionalism today and previous 
manifestations are the center’s current retention of military and macroeconomic 
control while conceding in the areas of local governance and fiscal revenues.  As 
a result of this historical double movement of localization and recentralization 
we see the groundwork for informal urban networks.   
Beginning in the Nineteenth Century, in the aftermath of the Taiping 
Rebellion, Li Hongzhang from Anhui emerged with the most powerful and 
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modernized army in China.40  Although he began as a provincial leader, his 
military victories against the Taiping led to him extending his influence over a 
large region that included territory from nearby provinces including Anhui, 
Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, and Shandong.  His military dominance enabled him and 
Zeng Guofan, another provincial leader, to gain control of the likin system (an 
internal transport tax on water routes) and therefore with an independent source 
of revenue he was only subservient to Beijing in name.41  Within time Li 
Hongzhang was appointed to handle China’s foreign relations by Empress Cixi, 
eventually commanding his provincial army to represent China in the Sino-
Japanese War and also negotiate the ensuing surrender conditions at the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki.  With the Qing Empire left with no bargaining chips vis-à-vis 
the localities, it did not take long for the Dynasty to collapse under the weight of 
revolution.  The fall of the Qing demonstrates the dangers of excessive local 
extrabudgetary funds and as a loss in military control. 
The weakness of the succeeding Republican state soon led to China’s 
return to a feudal economy during the period of Warlordism from 1917-1927.  A 
marginalized central government with nominal power could once again do little 
to orchestrate and enforce policy with China in a state of both political and 
economic federalism.  Domestic military campaigns to unify China and the 
internal struggle between the Guomindang (KMT) and Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) left the nation unable to repel Japanese invasion.  After Liberation 
                                                 
40 Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A study in nineteenth-century Chinese 
regionalism (University of Washington Press: 1964). 
41 Spector (1964) Ibid.   
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in 1945, the CCP gradually recentralized power and established military and 
economic control.   
During the Mao era, the degree of fiscal decentralization has been an 
indirect function of the need for a national public good such as security or 
macroeconomic stability.  During the 1950’s the system remained highly 
centralized in order to finance the Korean War, while in 1968, China adopted 
total centralization in response to the economic crisis that arose from the failed 
fiscal policies of the Cultural Revolution.42  Under Soviet-style central planning, 
provinces were akin to collection agencies for Beijing and lacked independent 
budgetary resources.  Under Mao and the first Five Year Plan (1953-1957) 
outlined a strategy of balanced regional growth was tied in with security reasons.  
The Third Front (san xian) Policy rested on the belief that in the event of Soviet 
invasion or attack, China could fall back on its interior and Western regions for 
protection.  As a result, areas that were not optimal investment sites were 
saturated with central funds, while the coastal area’s inherent geographic 
advantage went unfulfilled.  Provinces such as Sichuan and Hubei benefited 
most from the investment, but due to a lack of regional specialization and an 
investment policy based on regional preference rather than economic logic, 
regional disparity did not decrease.43  The Sixth and Seventh year plans focused 
on creating a complementary economic relationship between coastal and interior 
province, yet the coinciding rise of local protectionism and economic 
                                                 
42 Yehua Dennis Wei.  “Fiscal systems, investment, and regions.”  Regional Development in China 
(2003) 49. 
43 Mary Francoise Renard, “International trade and regional specialization in China” in Renard’s China 
and Its Regions (Northhampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002) 88-90. 
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fragmentation severely hindered such a relationship.  In 1952, the coastal region 
had only 14 percent of the total area of China yet had 42.3 percent of the 
population and 68.1 percent of the gross value of industrial output.44 
After the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989, Beijing ousted Zhao 
Ziyang and the conservative Chen Yun led a series of recentralization efforts to 
reign in the provinces and reassert central control after nearly a decade of 
economic reforms.  To the outside world, however, Beijing’s violent reaction to 
the Tiananmen  demonstrations seemed to signal a loss of party legitimacy and 
an erosion of central control.  In the wake of the Incident, scholars and 
journalists began speculation of China’s disintegration into independent or 
loosely associated states.  It was predicted that fiscal federalism of the 1980’s 
would be succeeded by political federalism.45  This forecast was given more 
credence following the denouement of the Cold War and former Communist 
regimes collapsed and dissolved into smaller republics.  In stark contrast, with 
China currently taking a more prominent role in East Asia and continuing its 
exceptional record of economic performance, the disintegration theory appears 
to be wholly discredited.  If we can use Beijing’s response to the East Asian 
Financial Meltdown in 1997 as an example of the center’s tight retention on 
macroeconomic control, it appears that the central government has emerged from 
its legitimacy crisis with great aplomb.46  For the first time in its history, the 
                                                 
44 Yehua Dennis Wei.  Regional Development in China: States, Globalization, and Inequality (2003)  
28-33. 
45 For a concise summary of the major proponents of the disintegration thesis, see Barry Naughton and 
Dali Yang’s, Holding China Together (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2004) 2-5. 
46 Dorothy J. Solinger reports on local government compliance to central macroeconomic objectives 
during the 1997-1998 Crisis despite intensified pressures of competitiveness between localities in 
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Chinese government has managed to successfully negotiate a power balance 
between the center and the localities.   
 It would not be until Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the 1980’s that the 
central government would formally begin to institute a dichotomy between political 
and economic control.  Huang Yasheng identifies the three major changes of reform 
era as the decentralization of output planning, increase in local fiscal control, and 
overhaul of the tax system.47  Fiscal federalism gave the provinces increased 
economic control over their localities, while despite debates over the political side 
effects of economic decentralization, there was no destabilizing transfer of political 
control.48  This central-local compromise ensured that Beijing could retain its political 
legitimacy and at the same time sustain economic growth. 49 Local authorities were 
given the ability to establish horizontal economic relations and cooperation between 
provinces without consulting the center.  Although government policy allowed for 
provincial regionalism (for example the designation of the Shanghai Economic 
Region of Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Fujian) the provinces 
could not overcome noncompliance from local authorities that undermined 
cooperation.50  Provinces were in competition with one other as they existed within a 
political framework where Beijing still maintained control over appointments and 
                                                                                                                                           
“Policy Consistency in the Midst of the Asian Crisis,” in Naughton and Yang’s Holding China 
Together (1994) 149-192. 
47 Yasheng Huang. Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-
Local Relations During the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)  55-58. 
48 Dali Yang argues that the center’s retention of control over the nomenklatura system of 
appointments was a critical factor.  Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions of China.   
49 Also, the center realized it could not effectively administer the provinces.  Susan Shirk, The Political 
Logic of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 153-155. 
50 Goodman, Ibid.  
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preferential policy, so had little incentive not to resort to local protectionism.51  Yet 
the role of the central government had greatly shifted during the 1990’s from director 
to regulator.52  The rise of local protectionism can be seen as an inadvertent offspring 
of fiscal reforms, as increased provincial pressure to deliver economic performance 
created competition between localities for markets and investment.53  With reforms of 
the tax system leading to increased extra-budgetary funds for localities, provinces 
now have the financial means to pursue their own interests. As a result, there is 
friction between central macroeconomic policies and developmental initiatives by 
localities, which are on one hand expected to promote their localities and on the other 
hand implement central policies that may contradict local interest.  Si Ming-Li 
explains this relationship: “China is still a very centralized state, and provinces still 
have to follow state directives.  But at times the alliance between provincial 
governments and enterprises is able to take measures to promote local interests even 
at the expense of national interests.”54 
   Provinces now compete for economic development and therefore have 
incentives to develop their main engines of growth and source of wealth: the cities. 
Even though a 7 percent annual growth rate is necessary to fulfill the goal for the 11th 
Five-Year Program, almost all provincial governments have planned annual rates 
above 9 percent.55  As provincial governments attempt to maximize growth, there is 
concentrated investment into targeted areas at the expense of intra-provincial equality.  
                                                 
51 Yang, Ibid. 138-142. 
52 Dali Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan (2004) Ibid. 
53 Kellee Tsai. “Off Balance: The Unintended Consequences of Fiscal Federalism in China.” Journal 
of Chinese Political Science, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 2004.  12-14. 
54 Si Ming-Li,  “China’s Changing Spatial Disparities,” in China’s Regions (2000) 171. 
55 “Economic Review: Local government sets higher GDP goal than central government.” Xinhua 
News Agency. February 22, 2006.   
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According to Yang (1997), provinces and local governments are engaged in a race of 
competitive liberalization, where all provinces try to avoid being last on the economic 
liberalization bandwagon.  Once economic liberalization was officially sanctioned by 
the central government, there has been intense competition from provincial 
governments to lobby for special preferential policies that encourage foreign 
investment.56 Because of provincial competition, only on rare exceptions will 
provinces successfully cooperate in order to increase their bargaining power.  In 1985, 
five provinces in the southwest, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Sichuan, and Tibet, 
cities of Chongqing and Chengdu formed the Southwest Economic Coordination 
Region (Xinan Jingji Xiezuoqu) to organize large-scale intra-regional trade fairs on a 
rotating basis, but the main goal was to create a provincial bloc that could jointly 
lobby the center.  In 1989, individual cities in southwest and northwest similarly 
joined forces in the “United Association of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Sichuan-Ningxia 
Borders (shaan-gan-chuan-ning diqu lianhehui).  These are just two examples of 
lagging provinces attempting to strengthen regional coordination in order to better 
compete with the more prosperous and influential coastal regions.  Even provincially-
initiated regional attempts often fail to enact meaningful economic integration.  
Theoretically, provinces should cooperate based on a regional adaptation of Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage; because particular areas are more efficient than 
others at producing some things, they specialize in production and create linkages 
with cities with complementary functions and needs.57  The areal specializations, in 
such cases, lead to macro-markets, and these markets gradually expand as a bottom-
                                                 
56 Yang (2004) 44-47. 
57 Cannon (1992) Ibid. 40-42. 
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up process that is supported by local governments and economic actors.  In the case 
of the Northwest provinces, however, there is an abundance of natural resources but a 
lack of processed goods fit for export.  As a result, there have been calls to coordinate 
processing industries in the region and create an inter-provincial industrial chain.58  
Yet while such coordination would greatly enhance the region’s competitiveness, 
such cooperation has failed to materialize.   
 This failure can be attributed to the pre-reform era, where central 
mandates calling for local self-reliance and enterprise self-sufficiency created a 
cellular economy. 59  The problem of duplication, or repetitive industries in 
neighboring localities, has been an enduring source of inefficiency and local 
protectionism.  This legacy, in turn, has hampered overall regional 
competitiveness.  For instance, there were two simultaneous construction 
projects of deepwater container ports in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Daya Bay, when 
only one port would have been necessary to complement Hong Kong’s Kwai 
Chung port.60  As a result, investment is redirected to other areas that are more 
attractive than individual projects.  The Pearl River Delta has five major 
international airports, even though regional economic development only requires 
two at most.61  Local governments took on a role as protectors of local industry, 
regardless of its position in a wider regional economy.  As a result, it did not 
matter if it was a raw material-producing region protecting its infant industries or 
                                                 
58 “NW Provinces: Join Forces to Develop Trade.” China Internet Information Center, November 29, 
2004.   
59 Audrey Donnithorne, “China’s Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends since the Cultural 
Revolution,” The China Quarterly, 52 (1972) 605-618. 
60 Yue-man Yeung, “Infrastructure Development in the Southern China Growth Triangle,” in Asian 
Development Bank’s Growth Triangles in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 140. 
61 Ding Ningning, “The Geographic Layout of China’s Regional Economies,” (August 2004) 4. 
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a manufacturing region defending its mature industries, local governments 
constructed barriers that prevented areal specialization.62  As Wedeman points 
out, during the 1980’s, there was a conflicting pressure for localities to export 
surplus production of their manufacturers for profit but also to restrict the 
external access to local markets, or in other words, “the resulting shift from a 
sellers’ to a buyers’ market created incentives to restrict access to local markets 
while aggressively exporting surplus production to other localities.”63  As China 
is still in the process of dismantling the cellular economy and combating local 
protectionism, in the case of informal urban networks that have access to foreign 
markets, these localities have found a new export market.   
 
The realization of natural economic territories 
 
The most important legacy of economic reforms that has led to informal urban 
networks is the realization of natural economic territories.  A conceptualization I 
borrow from is William Skinner’s “macro-regions” (only the concept, not the 
terminology) that determines regions based on a common market model rather than 
political administrative boundary.  According to Skinner, a regional economy can be 
defined by three factors: areal specialization in production, a differentiated 
occupational structure, and a hierarchical system of credit that supports a network of 
intraregional trade.64 Skinner’s study of how urban centers came to serve as the hubs 
                                                 
62 Wedeman (2003) Mao to Market Ibid. 159. 
63  Wedeman Ibid. 194. 
64 William Skinner. The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977) 218-
220. 
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of macro-regions in late imperial China still has relevance today and warrants another 
look due to the current primacy of economic development on local government 
agendas.  Skinner was the first to divide China into economic regions, arguing that 
the formation of regions was largely due to physiographic constraints.  Skinner 
mapped out nine macro-regions with boundaries determined by drainage basins, 
watersheds, and the crests of mountain ranges.  Geography, he argued, was the main 
factor in determining transport efficiency, trade flows, and linkages between cities 
and towns.  In Skinner’s macro-regional model, he pinpoints regional cores at river-
valley lowlands, which enjoyed major transport advantages compared to peripheral 
areas.  Within this system, cities serve as the nodes and command posts that direct 
activity within the region.65  He summarizes: 
 
In short, it appears that each system of cities developed within a physiographic 
region.  I eventually came to conceive of urban development – the formation of cities 
and the growth of their central functions – as a critical element in regional 
development – the processes whereby regional resources of all kinds, social and 
cultural as well as economic and political, were multiplied, deployed with greater 
effectiveness, and exploited with increased efficiency.66 
 
Skinner argues that major cities within each region developed on key transport 
routes leading into them, and that all cities within a physiographic region developed 
hierarchical transaction patterns culminating in one or more cities in the regional 
core.67  As trading centers, market towns and commercial cities were central nodes in 
the flow of goods and services, money and credit, as well as the sites for primary 
public institutions.  Because the extraction of economic surplus is a critical enabling 
                                                 
65 Skinner Ibid. 216. 
66 Skinner Ibid. 211. 
67 Skinner Ibid. 217. 
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mechanism of politics, it was efficient for political institutions to focus on 
commercial centers in their efforts to control and regulate the means of exchange and 
production, as well as to tap into the wealth of a local system.68 Domestic studies in 
space spatiality often serve as extensions of Skinner’s physiographic regions and use 
geography and trade as determinants of the region.  Yet despite the criteria for these 
regional studies, they are almost always limited to domestic political jurisdiction 
without considering the possibility of expanding the borders of the region to 
incorporate territories outside of China. 
The central government has recognized the importance of natural economic 
territories, and in 1985 opened the Changjiang River Delta Economic Region (around 
Shanghai), the Pearl River Delta Economic Region (around Guangzhou), and the 
Minnan Delta Economic Region (around Xiamen) to foreign investment due to their 
advanced economic development, communication systems, and tertiary education 
institutions, in order to spread the benefit from the SEZs to surrounding areas.69  
These areas are not just favorable geographic locations but also have important urban 
areas situated on them.  It is cities, not states, that are the leaders in turning favorable 
geographic position into economic advantage. 
 
The rise of urban governance and the case of Western Europe 
 
                                                 
68 Skinner. “Cities and the hierarchy of local systems” in The City in Late Imperial China (1977) 276. 
69 Anthony  Gar-on Yeh, “Foreign Investment and Urban Development in China,” in Li and Tang’s 
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My analysis of micro-regional urban networks in China will focus on what 
Neil Brenner calls “urban governance” or as he defines, “the broad constellation of 
social, political, and economic forces that mold the process of urban development 
within modern capitalism.”70  Brenner’s study on state space in Western Europe has 
an important insight of state space as an ongoing process rather than a fixed entity.   
In studying the rise of urban governance in Western Europe, Brenner shows that 
preceding state-led scale-making projects targeted urban areas for successful 
development.  Two objectives of these state scale-making projects were to embed 
cities within the state structure and to position cities within a network of capital 
accumulation.71  In the 1980’s, a wave of national welfare state retrenchment process 
across Western Europe forced local governments to secure an independent fiscal base 
as there was less budgetary support from central authorities.  Coincidentally during 
the same period, there was a “marked intensification of territorial inequalities…divide 
between winning and losing regions; various intra-national divides between booming 
urban cores and declining manufacturing zones or depressed rural peripheries; intra-
regional divides between central city cores and surrounding hinterlands.”72 As local 
governments became more independent in employing development policy, regional 
disparities became greater as certain urban areas grew at much faster rates than others.   
 Western Europe’s spatial transformation in the 1980’s is particularly relevant 
to my study as China attempted a similar scale-making project under Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reforms.  In 1979, Beijing granted tax and fiscal exemptions to 
                                                 
70 Neil Brenner.  “Urban governance and the production of new state spaces in western Europe, 1960-
2000.”  Review of International Political Economy 11:3 (August 2004)  455-456. 
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four cities (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou) on China’s coast and designated 
them as “Special Economic Zones” (SEZs) as an experiment to attract foreign 
investment and accelerate economic growth.  By 1984, there were fourteen coastal 
cities with preferential treatment were allowed to form Economic and Technological 
Development Zones (ETDZ).  These coastal cities were designed to form as the base 
for new industries and enterprises and serve as the future technological, economic, 
and social pillars of the entire country.73  Like the case of Western Europe, a closely 
interlinked and flourishing urban network left other regions marginalized and unable 
to compete.  Quite contrary to government expectations of a trickle-down effect of 
growth from developed urban cores to their poorer peripheries, there was instead a 
systematic reconcentration of development capital back into the favored urban 
network.74  There is little reason to believe that China’s story will be any different. 
 
                                                 
73 Yeung and Hu. Ibid, 9-10. 
74 Brenner. Ibid. 468-470. 
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CHAPTER II 





 I will now develop an analytic framework for conceptualizing informal urban 
networks. As the term “regionalism” is dependent on the scale, actors, and processes 
involved, I label informal urban networks as a form of micro-regionalism due to their 
smaller scale compared with other forms of regionalism with cities as the unit of 
analysis.  Compared to macro and sub-regions, in terms of sheer amount of territory 
covered by these networks, a micro-regional process is often localized and more 
sensitive to spatial distance than a macro-region.  Due to the smaller scale and 
distance between actors, micro-regions are usually connected in non-economic ways 
such as language, culture, or shared history.  Several antiquated dichotomies that 
informal urban networks defy are domestic versus international space, state versus 
society, and urban versus rural. Urban networks feature transnational links, 
cooperative state and society arrangements, and sprawling urban centers.  It is clear 
that there is a conflict between the central government’s analysis of regional 
networking and economic geographers.  The center’s strategy in the 1980’s hinged on 
following “step-ladder policy” for regional development where the coastal areas 
would develop advanced processing industries and utilize natural resources from the 
interior and western provinces.   Following Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
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advantage, it was predicted that each region would develop what they were best at, 
and a complementary and symbiotic relationship between coast and interior would be 
forged.  Opposing this stance is the contrary view that natural resources are becoming 
increasingly irrelevant in determining the economic landscape.  As Glaeser and 
Kohlhase argue (2004), consumption-related natural amenities (such as weather), 
state/city government policies, and historically developed infrastructure are the main 
factors preventing convergence to a single area.75  Although I believe this view is a 
bit simplistic, by looking at the actual pattern of regional development it appears to be 
more accurate than Beijing’s forecasts.  This chapter will develop a framework for 
approaching urban networks that modifies Glaeser and Kohlhase’s argument by 
approaching it through the lens of trade and economic linkage.  This chapter begins 
by redefining the role of the coastal city from a gateway port to a growth node, then 
identifies the three main agents of informal urban networks as local governments, 
local enterprises, and labor.  Once a basic framework that assesses the relationship 
and role of these agents is established, I discuss the determinants of scale for 
measuring the scope of these networks.  The purpose of this chapter is to explain why 
urban networks are not regional growth nodes but rather polarizing forces due to their 
tendency to keep investment and growth confined within the network.   
 
                                                 
75 E.L. Glaeser and J.E. Kohlhase, “Cities, regions and the decline of transport costs,” Regional 
Science, 83 (2004) 200. 
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2.1 THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CITY:  
THE CITY AS A NODAL UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
  
Administratively, my use of the “city” label refers to the de facto 
administrative unit below provinces and prefectures and above counties, townships, 
and villages within the political hierarchy.76  The designation of Beijing, Tianjin, 
Chongqing, and Shanghai as provincial-level municipalities (直辖市 zhíxiáshì) 
demonstrates the enormous political influence cities can wield.  Since 1983, over 280 
prefecture-level cities (地级市 dìjíshì) were designated that consist of a central city 
surrounded by a rural periphery.77  Reflecting China’s rapid urbanization, prefecture-
level cities have largely replaced prefectures as administrative units.78  In a report to 
the National People’s Congress in 1982, Zhao Ziyang said that the development of 
key economic cities (经济中心城市 jingji zhongxin chengshi) was to drive regional 
economic growth and therefore the nation, especially in the area of technical 
transformation and the upgrading of industrial capacity.  Under a State Council 
directive promulgated in 1986, many counties have been reclassified as cities in a 
county with a total population of less than 500,000, a county-town with a non-
agricultural population of at least 100,000, and annual output of at least 300 million 
RMB, qualify for city designation.  As a result many county cities encompass much 
rural area.79  The Open-door Policy was a key cause that has given cities such 
                                                 
76 The CCP Constitution only allows for three levels of province, county, and township yet in actual 
implementation there has been the addition of prefectures and villages as administrative levels.     
77 This policy was called市官县  (shi guan xian), which literally translates to “city governs county” 
78 In order to be a prefecture-level city, a pre-existing prefecture must have an urban centre with a non-
rural population over 250,000, a gross output of value of industry of 200,000,000 RMB, a greater 
tertiary industry output than primary industry, and over 35 percent of the GDP of a province. 
79 Kam Wing Chan, Cities with Invisible Walls (1994) 26-27. 
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centrality in the economy.  The policy established SEZ’s, opened up coastal cities to 
FDI, established economic and technological development zones, and reformed the 
foreign trade system.80   
With the progress of economic reforms, the urban-rural divide is becoming 
increasingly obsolete as an analytic framework.  Beginning in the late 1970’s without 
Mao’s anti-urban rhetoric, the government view of urbanization has shifted from one 
of caution to one of support.  By 1980, the National Conference on Urban Planning 
Work was no longer debating whether or not to encourage urban development but 
rather discussing the best urban development strategy.81  Official support of rapid 
urbanization has led to rural farmland shrinking at an alarming rate due to urban 
expansion and rural industrialization.  This sanctioned growth fever influences local 
governments to ignore environmental effects and overlook labor malpractice as they 
try and attract as much industrial capital as possible.  Ever since Mao’s rhetoric 
denouncing urban development has disappeared from government language, “cities” 
have expanded in size and are far from their literal translation of “walled cities” (城
市).  Rural-urban integration is a new feature of the economic landscape since 
reforms allow for five developments: state deregulation of the rural economy, free 
market capitalism, agricultural restructuring, the inflow of transnational capital, and 
regional transport infrastructure.82 
 
                                                 
80 Sze-yueh Wang and Lee-in Chen Chiu, “The Impact of Mainland China’s Open Door Policy” in 
China’s Regions, Polity, & Economy (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000). 
81 Chan calls this a shift from viewing urbanization as “the product of rural-urban antithesis under 
capitalism” to “an inevitable process of modern development,”  Chan, Cities with Invisible Walls, 104.   
82 George C.S. Lin, Red Capitalism in South China: Growth and Development of the Pearl River Delta 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 71. 
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Figure 4: Urban sprawl: a farmer looks on as construction begins 
photo taken by author in Hangzhou, July 2005 
 
The city serves as the building blocks for informal urban networks for the 
aforementioned reasons that they are fixed points at which all three of these elements 
converge.  They are also hubs for trade, commerce, and the primary locations of 
foreign direct investment.  Historically, port cities have served as gateways into China.  
During the Qing, the city of Canton (now Guangzhou) was the only designated 
foreign port and was the main gateway of trade between China and the rest of the 
world.  The city is my primary unit of analysis due their function as concentrated 
nodes of capital, labor, and industry.  Quite simply, the city is the physical 
accommodation where there is a concentration of all three factors.  Cities compete for 
firm investment and location, high living standards to attract talented labor, and as 
optimal nodes of exchange and processing of information and capital flows.83  The 
polarizing nature of cities is best articulated by Cook (2000) who argues that cities, 
“render disparities of wealth, status, housing provision and the like highly visible, and 
                                                 
83 Iain Docherty, Stuart Gulliver, and Philip Drake, “Exploring the Potential Benefits of City 
Collaboration,” Regional Studies, Vol. 38.4 (June 2004) 447. 
  Park - 47 
 47 
can threaten social cohesion because of this manifestation of unequal access to goods, 
services, wealth, employment opportunities and other features of contemporary 
life.”84  
Ever since the governance strategy of total administration of economy and 
society was abandoned by the central government in the late 1970’s, the communes 
and the household registration system were used to exert direct administrative control 
over rural and urban areas respectively.  The communes, however, have been 
replaced by the incentive-based institution of the household responsibility system.  
These reforms can be characterized as moving from a control system of direct 
surveillance to an indirect incentive-based one that allows individual actors more 
control over urban activity.85 
 
2.2  DEFINITIONS, KEY ACTORS, AND LINKAGES 
 
The usage of “informal” throughout this paper is quite different than 
traditional state-society conventions.  In the context of urban networks, “informal” 
pertains to the unofficial process of network formation not authorized by the central 
government.  Local governments are integral actors in my framework as they have 
shown a proclivity and the means to defy central mandates that conflict with their 
interests.  Informal institutions, in this regard, are best explained as the conflict 
between “official” and “natural” societal structures.  In late imperial China, Skinner 
                                                 
84 Ian G. Cook, “Pressures of Development,” in Cannon’s China’s Economic Growth, (2000) 41.   
85 Wing-shing Tang and Him Chung, “Urban-rural Transition in China: Beyond the Desakota Model,” 
in Li and Tang’s China’s Regions, Polity & Economy: A Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-
Reform Era.  (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press 2000) 283-284. 
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distinguishes between official structures as being comprised of yamens (local 
bureaucrats), political administrators, and officials within a formal hierarchy while 
natural structures as the marketing and trading systems, informal politics, and a 
nested subculture of elites and merchants. 86  Such natural structures serve as the 
backbone of informal urban networks today albeit in within a modified system.     
The study of informal urban networks is important due to the pressure they 
can place on formal governing institutions.  As Tsai (2003) points out, in non-
democratic settings where formal institutions exert their influence down a hierarchy 
without inputs from the bottom, a combination of constraints and opportunities for 
actors at the bottom lead to “adaptive informal institutions” that may eventually lead 
to the reform of formal institutions.87  While my usage of informal institutions strays 
from traditional state-society definitions, the potential effect of adaptive informal 
institutions to affect institutional change demonstrates the logic behind why informal 
urban networks are capable of influencing formal institutions.88     
When we combine the power of adaptive informal institutions with a 
relationship of institutional amphibiousness between formal and informal structures, 
we can begin to understand the theoretical potential for informal networks to exert 
enough endogenous pressure on formal institutions to shape and change them.     
 
                                                 
86 William Skinner, “Cities and the hierarchy of local systems” in The City in Late Imperial China 
(1977) 276. 
87 Kellee Tsai, “Coping By Innovating: the Formal Origins and Consequences of Informal Institutions 
in China,” paper prepared for the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
August 27-31 (2003). 
88 The rise of farmer’s markets is one such example of how informal institutions can exert pressure on 
formal institutions to change.  After widespread public complaints on the bad quality of foodstuffs, the 
central government opened free markets for agricultural produce (ziyou shichang) in 1977 in towns 
outside of cities.  The success of these markets led to the extension of farmers markets to twenty large 
cities in 1978, from Chan, Cities with Invisible Walls (1994) 100-101. 
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EMBEDDED KEY ACTORS 
 
I have divided my framework for informal urban networks into three actors: 
local governments, businesses, and labor.  All three of these sectors are embedded, 
mutually supportive, and most importantly, spatially confined within network systems.  
The most detrimental forms of local protectionism, for instance, are policies that 
shield the labor force, which in turn affects where businesses turn to for necessary 
human capital.  For further development, I have separated these into three subfields.  
The relationship between these actors is characterized by a modification of Ding’s 
institutional amphibiousness.89  Whereas in Ding’s theory, ambiguous boundaries 
between state and society leads to manipulation and conversion, within urban 
networks the relationship between state, labor, and enterprises is marked by 
cooperation and it is the relationship between central government and urban networks 
that exhibit manipulation and conversion.  This ambiguous relationship has formal 
institutional origins, but this paper deals with the informal incentives that foster 
cooperation between them.  The relationship is depicted in figure 2, where 
intersection between the circles represents the realm of converging interests.  The 
central overlapping area where all three conjoin determine the effectiveness of 
network formation; as comparisons between the case studies will show, the larger the 
central area of cooperation the stronger transnational links and economic weight the 
urban network has.  To borrow a term used by the World Bank, this relationship is not 
                                                 
89 See footnote 4 on Ding’s institutional amphibiousness. 
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so much cooperation but rather “collusive behavior”90 where there is an 




Fig. 5: three embedded actors with overlapping and ambiguous boundaries 
 
Local Government Policy 
 
Studies on East Asian economic regionalism often treat the relationship 
between booming investment between economic areas and domestic government 
policies as mutually exclusive.  Likewise, studies into growth triangles and economic 
links in the Asia-Pacific are usually unconcerned with the governing implications of 
                                                 
90 The World Bank’s usage involves collusion between local governments, enterprises, and banks 
(instead of labor).“China: Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralized Economy,” A World Bank 
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such linkages.    The local state is usually overlooked in economic studies, yet just 
because economic relations are largely informal does not preclude the involvement of 
state actors. 
In the case of China, the role of local state governments is particularly 
important due to their high level of integration with local businesses.  Not only do 
local governments promote and direct economic development within their territories, 
they provide protection for local industries.  Borrowing Oi’s (1999) notion of local 
state corporatism, local state and business interests often converge.91  Often when 
formal institutions are arranged in a hierarchical manner and are immune to popular 
will there is a resultant counterforce from informal institutions.92  Economic 
fragmentation is a direct result of protectionist policies designed to give local 
enterprises competitive advantages.  Although in regards to SOE’s, local governments 
adopted a policy of “developing the large, ignoring the small” (zhuada fangxiao), 
they still remained heavily vested in private sector development due to its 
contribution to economic growth.  Coinciding state and private interests have led to 
the phenomenon of “red-hat” enterprises where private enterprises, starved of official 
bank credit, register as state-owned enterprises in collaboration with local officials.  
As a result the dichotomy between state and business is ambiguous and the 
relationship, in the case of urban networks, can be characterized as cooperative and 
not predatory.   
                                                 
91 Jean Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform,” (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999). 
92 Tsai’s (2003) terming of “adaptive informal institutions” as informal institutions react and supply the 
demands of both political and economic actors.  “Coping by Innovating: The Formal Origins and 
Consequences of Informal Institutions in China,” 2. 
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 Local governments also influence the formation of informal urban networks 
due to their supply of preferential policy and control over public infrastructure 
projects.  While only Beijing has the formal authority to designate special economic 
zones or grant special incentives, there have been many informal attempts to attract 
investment by declaring special zones without the consent of the central government.  
In this regard local governments play a significant role in directing development  and 
supporting local businesses.  Their control over transport infrastructure leads to 
skewered construction in areas they deem will offer the greatest returns.  These 
choices of transportation projects, in turn, affect the choices of local businesses and 
influence the destination of investment.  Since transportation infrastructure is a public 
good, local governments affect the private production and consumption processes of 
firms and individuals.93    
 In regards to the spatial distribution of land, after economic reforms, local 
governments now collect land-use fees and charge for land-use rights. This income 
from land-leasing has become an invaluable source of revenue for local governments 
for use in infrastructure projects.  The combination of low labor costs and the high 
land price in coastal cities such as Guangzhou and Shanghai mean high rates of return 
for local governments to pour into infrastructure projects.94  As a result they can fund 
improvements in telecommunications, water transport, electricity projects, and road 
development that create a more attractive environment for foreign investment.  On the 
                                                 
93 Philip McCann and Daniel Shefer, “Location, agglomeration and infrastructure,” Regional Science, 
83 (2004) 179. 
94 In the cities of Guangzhou and Shenzhen, who began charging annual fees in 1983 and 1981, local 
governments tried to stimulate economic development from foreign investment by charging low annual 
fees for industrial investment and high fees to tourist and commercial uses.  Anthony Gar-oh Yeh, 
“Foreign Investment and Urban Development in China,” in Ling and Tang’s China’s Regions, Polity, 
& Economy (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2000) 53-55. 
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other hand, local governments in areas with unfavorable endowments and low land 
prices do not generate nearly as much revenue as their coastal counterparts.  This 
leads to less funding for infrastructure projects which then makes them less 




Local enterprises are the second sphere and are linked to local governments.  
This sector is crucial in creating transnational linkages between urban centers within 
China and major trading cities in East Asia.  As a result, foreign direct investment and 
outward investment from China will be the focal point of my study.  Local 
governments play a critical role in attracting FDI, and the race between provinces to 
liberalize their economies and attract investment has led to skewered economic 
growth.  While there is debate over whether there is a causal link between FDI and 
economic growth, in the case studies I have chosen, the urban networks all have a 
historical tradition of extensive foreign relations.  Central government attempts to 
make the interior provinces more attractive to FDI by offering them preferential 
policies, however, reveal the consensus in Beijing that FDI is necessary for promoting 
economic growth.  Accordingly, the regional disparity in terms of FDI reflects the 
regional disparity in terms of GDP contributions to the center’s coffers.95  The 
resulting disparity is a self-defeating cycle.  Perspective investors are less inclined to 
                                                 
95  Since 1978, the gap between Western and coastal areas consistently increased in terms of 
percentage of national GDP each region contributes.  In 1978, the eastern provinces commanded 52.5 
percent of the national GDP while the west had 17.8 percent.  In 2000, these figures were 64.3 percent 
and 14.6 percent.  China Statistical Year Book, various years in OECD’s Foreign Direct Investment in 
China: Challenges and Prospects For Regional Development.  54 (chart) 
  Park - 54 
 54 
invest in the poorer Western regions due to inconvenient transportation, backward 
telecommunication services, and poor urban environments, and as a result these areas 
must rely on funds from the central government for growth.96   
Foreign investment in China has mainly been greenfield and concentrated on 
secondary industries such as the manufacturing sectors.97  Foreign direct investment 
has spatial consequences for development.  Whereas in countries such as the United 
States, FDI has gone mainly toward the development of existing enterprises, while in 
China, FDI has been going toward the creation of new enterprises.98  In 1984, among 
the top eight sources of FDI to China, Japan and Hong Kong were the only 
contributors based in East Asia, accounting for 67.5 percent.  A little over ten years 
later in 1995, Asian countries accounted for 81.9 percent of FDI in China.99  FDI 
contributes to regional disparity, as Dennis Wei points out, “the spatial concentration 
of FDI often leads to a polarized process of urbanization and reinforces regional 
inequality…foreign investment tends to be located in major cities and core regions as 
these places have advantages in labor market conditions, access to domestic and 
international markets, preferential policy treatment, and infrastructure.”100  
Along with economic reforms there has been a rise in fiscal extrabudgetary 
funds for local governments as well as enterprise extrabudgetary funds.  Fiscal 
extrabudgetary funds are a set of nonbudgetary levies and charges of governments 
and administrative units and are largely used by local governments to avoid sharing 
                                                 
96 Jiang Xiaojuan, The New Regional Patterns of FDI inflow in China: Policy Orientation and 
Expected Performance, 61 in OECD Foreign Direct Investment in China.   
97 By the end of 2000, 72.64 percent of total investment was going to secondary industries.  Zhang Tao. 
“Utilization of Foreign Capital and Economic Growth in China.” The Chinese Economy, vol. 37, no. 1, 
(2004).   
98 Yasheng Huang,  Selling China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 6-8. 
99 Yehua Dennis Wei. Regional Development in China, 117. 
100 Yehua Dennis Wei. Regional Development in China, 118-125. 
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revenues with the central government.  Enterprise extrabudgetary funds, however, are 
the retained earnings and the depreciation funds of enterprises.  Due to increased 
enterprise independence since 1987, government control over SOEs has diminished.  
Account for 12 percent of GDP, these funds can no longer be legitimately regarded as 
part of government revenue.101 Extrabudgetary funds are important because they give 
enterprises increasing autonomy to support their economic decisions.   
In 1985, the total product of the private industrial firms was 18 billion yuan, 
which was 1.2 percent of the annual industrial output.  In 1990, the total output for 
private industrial firms reached 130 billion yuan, over 5 percent of the total industrial 
output.  Coupled with the new surge in private development, foreign direct 
investment accounts for about 4 percent of the economy.102 Foreign direct investment 
greatly contributes to spatial disparity since its destination is often areas with 
developed infrastructure and productive industries.  Of the six types of FDI in China, 
the most prominent ones are equity joint ventures, where foreign and domestic 
companies share operation of, profit, and losses of the venture and wholly foreign-
owned subsidiaries where the investor is responsible for capital, input, costs, 
marketing, and management of the venture.103  This combination of private growth 
and foreign investment leads to new enterprises being more likely to locate in the 
urban areas where they can better enjoy economies of scale; a process that contributes 
to industrial agglomeration in spatially concentrated areas.  Agglomeration occurs as 
firms try and take advantage of efficiency gains that come from decreased transaction 
                                                 
101 World Bank Comparative Study, China: Macroeconomic stability in a decentralized economy, 31 
102 Yijiang Wang and Chun Chang, Economic Transition under a semifederalist government.  The 
experience of China  China Economic Review, vol.0 issue 1,  Spring (1998) 10. 
103 Anthony Gar-on Yeh, Ibid. 20. 
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costs and the diversity of products exchanged within a limited area that happens as a 
result.104  Complementing this process is local government hard and soft institutional 
structures.  Fung (2005) defines hard institutional structures as transport infrastructure 
and soft institutional structures as increased transparency and economic reform 
designed to attract foreign investment.105 The embededness of enterprises and labor is 
present in both their institutional relationship as well as public perceptions.  A 2004 
Globescan survey conducted predominantly in urban areas showed that 78 percent of 
respondents had some to a lot of trust in large Chinese companies operating in the 
interests of society, with 69 percent having the same level of trust in foreign 




 Labor, or human capital, is a key part of the framework mainly because the 
most prominent forms of local protectionism are policies that restrict the movement 
of workers. While it can be argued that labor is merely a subset of local enterprises, 
for the purpose of this study it is given a separate grouping due to its different 
interests from the business sector.  The importance of labor is stated by Zweig (1999) 
who argues that, “even if [cities] possessed a comparative advantage in location, local 
entrepreneurship was necessary if communities were to shed their institutional 
                                                 
104 Borje Johansson and John M. Quigley, “Agglomeration and networks in spatial economies,” 
Regional Science, 83 (2004) 171 
105 Fung, K. C.; Garcia-Herrero, Alicia; Iizaka, Hitomi; Siu, Alan, Japanese Economic Review, v. 56, 
iss. 4, (December 2005) 408-16 
106 Globescan poll published on June 4, 2004.  Respondents were asked: “Please tell me how much you 
trust each of the following institutions to operate in the best interests of our society,” and answered 
either “a lot of trust” “some trust” “not much trust” “no trust at all” or “don’t know.” 
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constraints and path dependence, gain preferential policies which deregulated their 
relationship with the outside world, and turn their city’s comparative advantages or 
endowments into opportunities for growth and development.”107 The decisions made 
by enterprises, for example, on where to invest are motivated by profit, efficiency, 
and feasibility.  Labor, on the other hand, faces economic constraints of sufficient 
wages as well as non-economic constraints of native-place, language, and culture.  
Economic reforms have gradually increased the mobility of labor compared to the 
original hukou system.108  Urban jobs have been opened to outsiders under state 
conditionality, which has lead to the formation of a floating population (liudong 
renkou) that have been attracted to more prosperous regions seeking better job 
opportunities and a higher per capita income.109  Within the field of economic 
geography, included within this labor sector is knowledge, skills, and information, 
which is part of the central government’s erroneous assumptions is that the coastal 
cities will serve as a conduit to the Western region for new technology and skilled 
labor.  Wang and Zhang (2003) argue that knowledge is inexorably tied to labor since 
it contributes to growth by creating a more productive labor force, improving the 
income-earning ability of individuals, creating knowledge-related businesses, and 
                                                 
107 David Zweig, “Institutional constraints, path dependence and entrepreneurship,” in Jae Ho Chung’s 
Cities in China (New York: Routledge, 1999) 218. 
108 The hukou system divided Chinese society into registered agricultural and non-agricultural 
segments, where the majority 84 percent of Chinese people were classified as agricultural.  It was 
notoriously difficult for farmers to gain “non-agricultural” registration for urban areas, which was 
granted primarily to those that had a state job or were a university student.  As a result of these formal 
restrictions, many farmers adopted informal adaptive counter-measures.  One strategy was to forge 
personal connections (la guanxi) with urban contacts and set up businesses in larger cities through such 
informal linkages.  Hein Mallee, “Migration, hukou and resistance,” in Perry and Selden’s Chinese 
Society: Change, conflict and resistance (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2000) 139-141.   
109 Donggen Wang and Li Zhang, “Knowledge Disparity and Regional Inequality in Post-reform 
China,” Post-Communist Economies, vol. 15, no. 3, Sept (2003) 395. 
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ameliorating economic efficiency and labor productivity.110  The notion of 
knowledge-spillover is largely discredited when such knowledge is largely contained 
within agglomerated industries and networks.111 Studies done by Lin, Wang, and 
Zhao (2004) on interregional migration reveal a startling increase in inland to coast 
migration from 32.5 percent of all inter-provincial trade in a 1985-1990 period to 60.1 
percent in a 1995-2000 period.112  The percent of working-age migrants moving from 
coastal areas to inland decreased from 14 percent to 6.1 percent during the same 
periods.113  In the wealthy coastal areas in particular, workers within informal urban 
networks are tied by shared cultures, language, and identity.  As a result, local 
governments enforce protectionist policies to prevent the exit of skilled labor and the 
choices of enterprises on where to invest are strongly influenced by these non-
economic factors.  Labor is also a fundamental factor that affects the amount of FDI a 
city can attract.  Foreign investors find China appealing due to the abundance of 
cheap, unorganized, and relatively skilled labor with low government regulation.114 
 One consequence of economic reforms was that the buoyant labor markets 
grew beyond administrative boundaries. A mobile and flexible labor market is a 
                                                 
110 “Knowledge” is studied by the level of educational attainment of population, public spending on 
knowledge advancement in education and research, the marketisation of innovations such as patents, 
and the physical knowledge infrastructure of schools and universities.  In empirical studies it is clear 
that regional economic disparity coincides and is directly correlated with knowledge disparity. Wang 
and Zhang (2003) Ibid. 384. 
111 Silicon Valley in the United States, for example, is a good demonstration of concentrated 
agglomeration of computer technology within a limited area that, supporting Krugman’s assumptions, 
attracts more investment from other less developed areas due to its developed infrastruture.  Innovation 
is quickly diffused throughout the region due to strong networks and skilled labor tends to migrate 
within the Valley instead of leaving it.   
112 Justin Y. Lin, Gewei Wang, and Yaohui Zhao, “Regional Inequality and Labor Transfers in China,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 52 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2004) 594. 
113 Lin, Wang, and Zhao (2004) Ibid. 594. 
114 A survey of 10,000 Japanese companies in 1990 showed that the low cost of labor was a primary 
reason for investment in China.  The lack of unions and organization in the Chinese case suggests its 
edge over other sources of low cost labor in several Latin American countries.  Weiping Wu, 
Pioneering Economic Reform in China’s Special Economic Zones (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999) 66-67.   
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prerequisite for structural economic transformations due to its consequences for 
industrial functioning and innovation.115  If the labor market is contained by 
government policy, then such economic transformations become difficult to enact.   
 
2.3 NETWORK LINKAGES  
 
A bit overdue is a discussion on what exactly constitutes a “network.”   
Networks can have several different types of meanings.116 During the Qing, different 
urban systems were integrated through communication linkages and informal links 
among yamen functionaries that traveled between cities.  They were primarily linked 
by shared conceptions of a “same-native-place” which generated trust and thus 
reduced transaction costs.117  We can look at the phenomenon of network formation 
between urban centers separately through each of the main actors of local 
governments, local enterprises, and labor.  Local governments affect network 
formation through policy choices for industrial and infrastructure investments,  
securing development capital for their localities, and cultivating domestic and 
overseas business networks.118  As a result, local governments are partially 
responsible for the physical linkage between urban centers by directing the 
development of transport infrastructure.  McCann and Shefer (2004) articulate this 
                                                 
115 Dominic Power and Mats Lundmark, “Working through Knowledge Pools: Labour Market 
Dynamics, the Transference of Knowledge and Ideas, and Industrial Clusters,” Urban Studies, 41.5 
(2004) 1026-1028. 
116 Edward Chen and Peter Drysdale, Corporate Links and Foreign Direct Investment in Asia and the 
Pacific, (Australia: Harber Educational Publishers, 1995) 6. 
117 William Skinner. “Urban and Rural in Chinese Society” in The City in Late Imperial China. 270 
118 Jae-ho Chung, Cities, 926. 
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relationship and its impact on network formation, stating that “the impacts of 
infrastructure provision will depend on how the infrastructure dovetails with the 
range of available regional business incentives, and planned linkages between new 
infrastructure and existing infrastructure networks.”119  Cooperation between state 
and enterprises means that state infrastructure projects are coordinated to support 
interfirm linkages between cities.   
Besides being systems of exchange that can provide benefits such as 
coordination, capital, risk minimization, and information, network formation can be 
seen as an informal process that is a response to a legal system that does not provide 
reliable contract enforcement or secure property rights. 120  As a result, local actors 
have incentives to develop network alternatives that can provide them.  Local 
alliances that arise from network formation are more useful to individual actors than a 
regulatory systems that create risks or obstacles for foreign investors.121  
 Local enterprises support network formation through strategic investment 
choices, which we can categorize into internal and external networking.  As Chen and 
Drysdale (1995) distinguish internal networking is determined by ownership control 
while external networking is the use of bonding mechanisms of a non-equity type 
such as licensing, supplier or original equipment manufacturer contracts, 
subcontracting, or strategic alliances.122  In terms of firms, networking is different 
from the bonds of market interaction due to the benefits that arise from linkages.  
                                                 
119 Philip McCann and Daniel Shefer, “Location, agglomeration and infrastructure,” Regional Science, 
83 (2004) 179. 
120 Natasha Hamilton-Hart in “The Regionalization of Southeast Asian Business: Transnational 
Networks in National Contexts.” In Remapping East Asia, 171. 
121 Natasha Hamilton-Hart in “The Regionalization of Southeast Asian Business: Transnational 
Networks in National Contexts.” In Remapping East Asia, 172. 
122 Chen and Drysdale (1995) Ibid. 205  
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Link transactions between firms create an established relationship that returns profit 
based on how often and intensively the network is utilized.123  Taking all of the above, 
we can detect network formation between urban centers by frequency of use and the 
volume of economic activity.     
Network formation occurs among labor as well, as migrants provide 
information and assistance with moving, finding jobs and accommodation to later 
migrants from their own villages, thus linking specific origins with specific 
destinations.124 In regards to labor networking, a major shortcoming of a limited focus 
on the economic aspect of labor is the cultural factor that can have a large influence in 
shaping urban networks.  While I will address the cultural aspect in each case study, 
due to the subjective nature of culture it will not be the focus.  In the formal Shanghai 
Economic Region, for instance, there was a significant lack of cooperation in areas in 
the lower Changjiang River due to language and cultural barriers.  I am not arguing 
that informal urban networks are determined by such cultural factors but the impact in 
many cases is significant.  Although culture is impossible to quantify and empirically 
determine, cultural identity plays a strong part in differentiating between core and 
peripheral nodes in an informal urban network.  Fujian, for example, is home to a 
significant overseas Chinese population, and for this very reason attracts a fair share 
of investment.  Because the Chinese labor market is highly segmented with a dual 
labor market where immigrants work in the second, informal sector, where they must 
                                                 
123 Bruce Johansson and John M. Quigley, Agglomeration and networks in spatial economies (2004) 
172. 
124 Hein Mallee, “Migration, hukou, and resistance” in Perry’s Chinese Society (New York, 
RoutledgeCurzon 2000) 143. 
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rely on personal networks (guanxi) to permeate their way into the permanent 
workplace.125   
 
2.4 SCALE AND SCOPE 
 
 Once we establish the key actors and process driving informal networks, what 
remains to be answered are the factors that determine the scale and scope of urban 
networks.  The actual scope of urban networks is difficult to accurately determine due 
to overlapping sectors among all three actors.  The indeterminate borders of economic 
linkages make it difficult to accurately pin point the amount of territory involved in 
urban networks.  It is impossible to draw a line on a map and announce the end of one 
and the beginning of another.  As I result I propose different criteria in determining 
the scale of urban networks that is based on spatial concentration rather than distance.  
The three determinants of scale that I use are the supply of preferential policy, the 
agglomeration of investment, and the density of transport links within the network.   
How can we distinguish the core of an informal urban network from its periphery?  
By mapping urban networks along the scale of activity between the three actors of 
local governments, local enterprises, and labor, we can measure scope by examining 
the supply of preferential policy, the agglomeration of industry, and the development 
of transport infrastructure.  Within the economic geography literature, scope of 
enterprises can be measured through spatial agglomeration.  As Krugman argues, the 
                                                 
125 Dorothy J. Solinger, “The floating population in the cities,” in Kraus’s Urban Spaces in 
Contemporary China (1995) 63-70. 
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location of demand itself depends on the distribution of manufacturing in a self 
strengthening cycle.126 Therefore, by observing the placement of manufacturing bases 
we can get a sense of the presence of urban networks.   
 
 
Figure 6: The importance of adequate transport infrastructure  
Photo taken by Hardy Simes, Hangzhou, July 2005 
 
Looking at transport infrastructure with industrial agglomeration is 
particularly interesting due to its revelation of priority and volume of trade in a 
specific area.  In order to show that growth is spatially biased, my framework of 
informal urban networks relies on the combination of these two spatial phenomena of 
agglomeration and network formation.  Despite Glaeser and Kohlhase’s (2004) 
claims that analyzing physical infrastructure (such as transport links) is an antiquated 
strategy for analyzing modern urban regional economies due to declining transport 
costs, it works in this case since China is still a developing country.  Since the 
                                                 
126 Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). 
  Park - 64 
 64 
adoption of economic reforms, local governments now have the funds and incentives 
to pour into infrastructure projects.  Studies done by Kumar, however, show that after 
economic reforms, there was a severe lack of adequate transport infrastructure to 
sustain growth.  In 1989, it is estimated that at 200 million tons of freight, 10 percent 
of total freight capacity was unsatisfied in China.127    
 
 
Figure 7: Conceptualization for urban networks 
 
Therefore we combine all of these factors we have a framework for studying 
informal urban networks that features three actors of local governments, local 
enterprises, and labor. The city that these actors interact within is drawn with dashed 
lines to show the permeable borders within the network.  The outside box is solid due 
                                                 
127 Before economic reforms, China’s rate of investment in transport has averaged around 1.3 percent 
of GNP, compared to other developing nation’s transport investment from 2 – 3.8 percent of GNP. 
Anjali Kumar, China Deconstructs (1994) 101-103. 
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to protectionist policies that block the free movement of goods, labor, and capital 
outside of them.  These cities serve as nodes and are linked by the physical 
connection of transport infrastructure between cities, the cultural connection between 
the cores of place, culture, peoples and the economic connection of investment.  The 
size of each actor is unequal according to specific factors.  For instance, in the case of 
Shanghai, local enterprises play a much larger role than they do in Kunming for the 
simple fact that Shanghai’s industry is much bigger than Kunming’s.   
 
Figure 8: The virtuous but exclusive cycle of spatial concentration 
  
As this chapter has demonstrates, informal urban networks are by their very 
composition, spatial biased and exclusive processes.  All three actors, local 
governments, local enterprises, and labor, are arranged in a polarizing way that acts 
more like a magnet than a growth node.  Local government policy through 
preferential policy clearly demarcates which areas receive special exemptions and 
investment advantages while constraining the movement of labor markets.  Local 
enterprises agglomerate at certain areas and foreign direct investment is drawn to 
areas that have pre-existing advantages.  Concluding from this, there is what I call a 
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contributes to industrial agglomeration, which in turn develops both physical and 
transport infrastructure, which then attracts even more investment.   
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CHAPTER III: CASE STUDIES 
 
Figure 9:The sites of case studies juxtaposed with a map of the administrative 
provinces of China 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Now I present three case studies of informal urban networks and use them to 
highlight different aspects not covered in the analytic framework.  It is important to 
note that each central city has had a considerable historical advantage within their 
regions which distinguishes them.  Guangzhou was originally the sole port of entry 
for foreign goods, Kunming was part of the Silk Road trade routes, and Shanghai has 
a tradition of foreign investment.  The case studies briefly look at spatial biases in 
Guangdong, Shanghai, and Yunnan for the main purpose of illustrating the diverse 
manifestations of informal urban networks.  The purpose of this study is to highlight 
the rise of micro-regionalism, not to provide an extensive qualitative and quantitative 
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study.  To match this aim, the studies are not comprehensive proofs of my analytic 
framework, but  are focused to augment particular aspects to my overall argument.  In 
the Guangzhou urban network, I look in particular at intra-provincial disparity.  In the 
Shanghai case study I focus on inter-provincial growth, and I conclude with the 
Kunming urban network that demonstrates linking micro-regions with a sub-region.  
In order to show how informal urban networks fragment the economy and are 
simultaneously governed by local incentives, my case studies are mainly focused on 
local choice for economic integration.  In each case, economic development is mainly 
confined within provinces but not within national borders, and the formation of local 
disparity disputes the strategy of supporting growth nodes for alleviating economic 
disparity and encouraging inter-provincial cooperation.   
 The three urban networks were selected due to varying local conditions, local 
government strategy, and foreign relations.  As mentioned earlier, urban networks 
have formed because of central government policies but their growth is fueled by 
local actors.  Each urban network has a unique origin and has pursued growth in 
remarkably diverse ways.  Chapter II developed a normative framework that 
identifies commonalities and three constant actors of local governments, local 
enterprises, and labor.  Despite their variety, successful informal urban networks 
seem to have several prerequisites.  Each case study should not be considered 
individually but as parts of a collective whole that contributes to the study of urban 
networks.  When taken together, the studies will show the ineffectiveness of formal 
government attempts to determine regions and the resultant local counter-strategies.   
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Figure 10: A Guangzhou Urban Network 
 
My first case study is the Guangzhou network that features Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  Guangzhou’s domestic and 
foreign linkage is a model demonstration of informal urban networks.  Of the first 
four SEZ’s designated by the central government, two of them (Shenzhen and Zhuhai) 
are located in Guangdong province.  Their proximity to Hong Kong and Macao 
respectively was an intentional choice by the central government intended to 
strengthen economic links between the mainland and the two external economies.  
Historically, Guangzhou (previously Canton) had a virtual monopoly of China’s 
overseas trade as the sole port of entry for several important tribute missions.  As a 
Zhuhai (SEZ)  
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result it has been gifted with centrality in foreign trade based on its traditional 
historical position in overseas trade.128  
Guangzhou is the hub of the urban network due its geographical position and 
administrative power over Guangdong Province as its provincial capital.  The case of 
Guangzhou is a model example of informal urban networks.  The SEZs of Zhuhai and 
Shenzhen along with the Special Administrative Regions (SARs tèbiéxíngzhèngqū特
别行政区) of Hong Kong and Macao are government-created confined economic 
spaces with preferential policy having exact geographical delineations.129  When 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai were originally designated as SEZs, the central government 
allotted them 327.5 square kilometers and 6.7 square kilometers respectively.  As the 
four original SEZs recorded record economic growth, this boundary was expanded 
from 338.37 square kilometers total to 632 square kilometers.130  By giving these 
cities investment and fiscal advantages, they also became important sites for contact 
development with overseas Chinese networks.131 As a result we can clearly see the 
nodal aspect of growth in the Pearl River Delta that demonstrates highly concentrated 
growth in designated areas compared to their immediately contiguous surroundings.   
The provincial capital of Guangzhou is one of the richest cities in China, and 
Zhuhai and Shenzhen were both among the first SEZs.  Although it is sometimes 
argued that Guangdong was given unfair advantages compared to Shanghai due to its 
                                                 
128 Skinner 239-240. 
129 Although they belong to China, I count Hong Kong and Macao as foreign economies due to their 
fiscal autonomy that includes their own currency, independent financial institutions, and control over 
foreign economic relations.  The stark difference between the Mainland and the two SARs is best 
demonstrated by the moniker of Beijing’s SAR policy: “One country, two systems.” 
130 It is important to note that this number excludes the SEZ of Hainan island.  Since Hainan has a total 
area of 33,920 square kilometers, including it would have increased the total area of SEZs to 34,552 
square kilometers.  Figures taken from Yeung and Hu, Coastal Cities in China (1992) 309.   
131 Peter Katzenstein, A World of Regions (2005) 192.   
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lax remittance requirement to the central government, by the early 1990’s, 
Guangdong was contributing as much as Shanghai to the central treasury.132 Off 
Guangdong’s coast there is the prosperous Hong Kong economy, with which the 
provincial government has exerted much effort to build strong linkages.  Although 
Hong Kong was formally returned to the Mainland in 1997, the central government 
has pursued a “one country, two systems policy” much akin to suzerainty status 
where the SAR retains administrative and fiscal control but cedes power in foreign 
relations.  In 1994, Guangzhou and Shenzhen were among thirteen designated sub-
provincial cities (sometimes referred to as deputy-provincial cities), granting them 
administrative powers just below provincial governments.  Within the Guangzhou 
urban network, each node has significant fiscal autonomy to coordinate relations 
within the network.  Wang Yijiang even argues that this high level of local autonomy 
makes the nodes greater magnets for investment.  In the SEZs such as Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai, Wang Yijiang claims that these zones have developed a reputation of 
ignoring central directives and concordantly feature less price control, regulation for 
market entry and exit, and greater self-restraint from predatory taxes.133    
 There is egregious spatial inequality and economic disparity in Guangdong 
province.  If we divide the province into the Pearl River Delta and its peripheral area 
we see a sharp contrast in industrial agglomeration, foreign investment, and 
concentration of wealth.  From 1980 to 1990, the Pearl River Delta (excluding the 
SEZs) registered higher growth rates than Guangdong province in general, with 
                                                 
132 Figures taken from Dali Yang in Naughton’s China Deconstructs (1994) 87. 
133 It should be noted, however, that cases exist that show otherwise.  In Guangdong, highly successful 
refrigerator manufacturer Kelon was forced by the provincial government to buy a non-profitable state-
owned air-conditioning company at an exorbitant price greatly exceeding its actual value, which led to 
Kelon’s eventual bankruptcy.  From Huang Yasheng’s Selling China (2004).  
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annual GDP growth in the Delta at 16.5 percent compared to 12.3 percent in the rest 
of Guangdong.134  Looking at the geography of the region we see that there is a small 
growth triangle around the delta with Guangzhou at the apex and Hong Kong and 
Macao as the other vertices.   
 
    
http://www.landingchina.com/images/china_map/maps_of_cities/Shenzhen.jpg 
Figure 11: the Pearl River Delta and major transport linkages 
   
In 1990, the Guangdong provincial government only financed 6.4 percent of 
infrastructure development while 34 percent was funded by localities and 21 percent 
was funded by foreign capital.135 Local self-reliance was required for growth, with 
many localities raising funds locally through domestic loans, self-financing, and 
foreign capital.  The Pearl River Delta area, due to its reception of preferential policy, 
                                                 
134 Yue-man Yeung, “Infrastructure Development in the Southern China Growth Triangle,” in Asian 
Development Bank’s Growth Triangles in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 157. 
135 The remaining financing came from domestic loans and “other sources”.  Guangdong Statistical 
Yearbook 1992. 
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made it more attractive site for foreign investment and therefore capable of self-
financing infrastructure development.  Hopewell Holdings Bank, for example, raised 
$800 million for financing the Guangdong-Shenzhen-Zhuhai superhighway, 
borrowing from 29 other international banks.136  Since their designations as SEZ’s 
both Zhuhai and Shenzhen have experienced a sudden inflow of basic infrastructure 
investment.137   
 
The Foreign Alternative 
 
In Guangdong province, there has a dramatic increase in FDI, jumping from 
$515 million in 1985 to $15.5 billion in 2003. 138  Currently, Guangdong attracts the 
second most FDI in China only to Jiangsu.  However, the pattern or targets of FDI 
within the province are highly concentrated at the nodes of the urban network.  
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai are all heavily dependent of FDI, with FDI 
providing up to a third of all fixed investment in Shenzhen.   During the 1980’s, 
Shenzhen’s generation of foreign exchange increased from $11 million in 1980 to 
$2.17 billion in 1989.139  Hong Kong, the largest investor in China, contributes over 
half of total FDI inflows into China from 1979 to 1999.140  In 1990, FDI from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan that comprises such a large percentage of total FDI into China, is 
heavily concentrated with about 80 percent of FDI going to metropolitan or coastal 
                                                 
136 Yue-man Yeung, “Infrastructure Development in the Southern China Growth Triangle,” in Asian 
Development Bank’s Growth Triangles in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 139. 
137 As of 1992 they had jointly attracted 20 billion yuan.  Yeung and Hu, China’s Coastal Cities, (1992) 
308.   
138 China Data Online, Guangdong Provincial Statistics 2003. 
139 Yeung and Hu, 308. 
140 Kevin Zhang.  “China’s Inward FDI Boom and the Greater Chinese Economy,” The Chinese 
Economy, 34.1 (2001) 79. 
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areas.141  While Hong Kong investment extends all over the mainland, interviews 
done with Hong Kong investors reveal that they were often wary of investing 
elsewhere besides Guangdong.  They were usually aware that they could save money 
investing elsewhere, but concerns over procuring supplies, unknown compositions of 
other workforces, and language differences in other areas made Guangdong their 
primary choice.142   
Zhang’s (2001) empirical research shows that Hong Kong in China is 
primarily motivated by cheap labor, incentive policies, and market access.143  With 
massive inflows of migrants providing cheap labor, preferential policies, and 
industrial agglomeration, and geographic proximity, Guangzhou and the SEZs in 
Guangdong are ideal investment sites with unfair advantages over other areas within 
the province.  As a result, it is no surprise that Hong Kong and Taiwanese investment 
in Guangdong is heavily skewed toward the urban centers in the Pearl River Delta.  It 
is estimated that an excess of 30 percent of Hong Kong notes circulate in Guangdong, 
highlighting the interconnectedness of the two economies.144 Goodman (1994) points 
out, however, that geographical proximity was not the main factor behind a 
blossoming economic relationship between Hong Kong and the Pearl River delta.  
Just fifteen years ago the linkage was less obvious due to the presumed clash between 
a reforming centrally-planned economy and a booming free market economy.  The 
                                                 
141 The actual percent is 79.39.  It should be noted that FDI from developed countries was more biased 
toward the coastal region, with 51.22 percent of investment going to the coastal region and 33.84 
percent going directly to metropolitan areas.  Figures taken from the Special Report on US Investment 
in China, US-China Business Council (1990).   
142 Constance Lever-Tracy, David Ip, and Noel Tracy, The Chinese Diaspora and Mainland China 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1996) 243-245. 
143 This market access is greatly facilitated by Chinese connections, where Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
investors have operational advantages over other investors.  Kevin Zhang.  “China’s Inward FDI Boom 
and the Greater Chinese Economy,” The Chinese Economy, 34.1 (2001) 
144 Daivd Goodman and Feng Chongyi in China Deconstructs (1994) 191. 
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actual catalyst for integration, he claims, was largely from individual economic 
enterprises making judgments about their own development.145  
Because goods manufactured by foreign enterprises are forbidden for export to the 
domestic market, foreign enterprises in Guangzhou and the SEZs choose to direct 
their linkages outward linkages instead of inward.  Both finished and semi finished 
products are often sent to Hong Kong or Macao for re-export rather than going to 
other domestic economies.146 Guangdong relies on Hong Kong’s service industries 
and commercial services, one-third of Guangdong’s production goes toward the 
domestic economy, while a third is exported.147  Hong Kong’s re-exports of goods 
made in Guangdong under outward processing contracts were worth US $36 billion in 
1992, greater than its domestic exports of US $30 billion.148 Also, Hong Kong is an 
intermediary site for investors from foreign nations such as Taiwan and other Western 
nations.149  Guangzhou is more of an economic complementary to Hong Kong than 
other provinces in China.  The majority of Hong Kong direct investment into China is 
focused on labor-intensive and low-technology goods for the international market.  
Developed countries investing in China tend to target access to China’s domestic 
market in capital-intensive goods.150 The regional specialization that the central 
government is trying to promote has formed with most success without its guidance 
and with an eye on the global, not domestic economy. Instead of fitting on a domestic 
                                                 
145 David Goodman and Feng Chongyi in China Deconstructs (1994) 190. 
146 Wang Jun, “Expansion of the Southern China Growth Triangle,” in the Asian Development Bank’s 
Growth Triangles in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 159. 
147 Womack and Zhao, 161-163. 
148 Yun-Wing Sung 57. 
149 Graham, Edward M. and Wada, Erika, "Foreign Direct Investment In China: Effects On Growth 
And Economic Performance," Institute for Intuernational Economics Working Paper No. 01-03. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=300884 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.300884 
150 Kevin Zhang.  “China’s Inward FDI Boom and the Greater Chinese Economy,” The Chinese 
Economy, 34.1 (2001) 80. 
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production chain, Guangzhou and the SEZs are more aligned within a greater East 
Asian production chain by providing needed cheap labor for labor-intensive goods for 
other East Asian nations.   
Coupling this external economic focus, Guangzhou also has high rates of 
outward emigration to foreign countries instead of inward movement to China.  
Adversely, Shenzhen did not focus on labor-intensive industries and restricted the 
inflow of unskilled labor, leading to the rapid increase in labor wages.  In an attempt 
to recruit skilled labor, Shenzhen has made arrangements with Hong Kong investors 
for Shenzhen students abroad to be guaranteed employment on return to the SEZ.151  
From looking at per capita incomes in the region, we can see that there is a difference 
between cities located within the urban network and those outside of it.  Zhaoshan, 
located north of Guangdong and excluded from the network 1,130 yuan in 1990.  
Heyuan, located to the east of Guangzhou, only has 715 yuan.  Maoming, located to 
the west has a per capita income of 1,238 yuan. The biggest rates are south of 
Guangzhou along the urban network, with Shenzhen a staggering 4785 , Dongguan 
4,078, and Zhongshan with 3,511.152  It is clear that even with provinces, location is 
crucial.  
      
 
 
                                                 
151 Wang Jun, “Expansion of the Southern China Growth Triangle,” in the Asian Development Bank’s 
Growth Triangles in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 163. 
152 Figures calculated from the Statistical Data of National Economy in the Municipalities and 
Counties of Guangdong, 1980 to 1990, in Wang Jun, “Expansion of the Southern China Growth 
Triangle,” in the Asian Development Bank’s Growth Triangles in Asia (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 162. 
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Development strategies of peripheral areas: the case of Panyu 
 
Panyu, as geographically part of the Guangdong-Shenzhen linkage, sought 
development through infrastructure investment; in particular, highway construction.  
This choice was made in consideration of its geographic location en route from 
Guangzhou to Zhuhai and Hong Kong.  Slow growth in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
sobered the local government into realizing that rather than support uncompetitive 
local industries, a more practical strategy for development was to focus on facilitating 
the linkage between Guangdong, SEZs, and Hong Kong through transport 
infrastructure development.  In 1985, the local government of Panyu created a special 
organization called the “Directive Department for the Construction and Management 
of Roads and Bridges,” that focused on a development programme founded on the 
belief that “road construction can lead to economic prosperity” (lutong caitong).153  It 
is interesting to note that the two major investment projects during this period was the 
construction of the Ruoxi Bridge which connected Panyu to Guangzhou and the 
Humen Ferry at the mouth of the Pearl River Delta that facilitates trade between 
Zhuhai, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong.  Construction was funded by the Panyu 
government and three Hong Kong companies.154 Lin (2000) makes the observation 
that in Guangdong, it was local governments instead of the central or provincial 
                                                 
153 Before 1984, local budgets show clearly favor developing industry and barely allocated any funds 
to capital construction in the transport sector.  Yet in the period from 1980 to 1991, the Panyu 
government is estimated to have invested 900 million yuan in the transport sector, with the sharpest 
increase occuring after 1984.  George Chu-sheng Lin, “Time Space Compression in the Zhujiang Delta: 
A Case Study of Panyu,” in Li and Tang’s China’s Regions, Polity, & Economy: A Study of Spatial 
Transformation in the Post-Reform Era,” (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000) 252-253.  
154 George Chu-sheng Lin, Ibid. 256.    
  Park - 78 
 78 
government that has been chiefly responsible for mobilizing and investing in 
construction capital.155   
Another aspect that is worth noting is the rapid increase in migrants that 
relocated to Panyu coincidentally after 1985.  Due to its proximity to Guangzhou and 
the improvement in transport links, the temporary population of Panyu remained 
below 5,000 before 1986, while by 1991 there were 89,167.156 Opposed to the city 
leading county administrative reforms (shi guan xian) in 1983, in the case of Panyu, 
development was originally hampered by its relationship and subordination to 
Guangzhou.  Lam Tao-chiu’s (1999) study of Panyu shows that instead of enjoying 
beneficial “radiation effects” for being so close Guangzhou, Panyu was consistently 
demanded to serve the political and economic interests of Guangzhou.157 Consider 
then, that Nanhai province that is to the west of Panyu and not directly located on the 
urban network, despite efforts to gain foreign investment  in infrastructure projects 
could only garner $3.69 US million compared to Panyu, where the Panyu Bridge 
alone cost about $85 million.158  Panyu’s geographic position made transport 
infrastructure development the most feasible strategy for growth, but areas not 
positioned within the network have little recourse.   
 
 
                                                 
155 George Chu-sheng Lin, Ibid. 257.    
156 Statistics taken from the Public Security Bureau.  George Chu-sheng Lin, Ibid. 265.    
157 Lam Tao-chiu, “Panyu and Nanhai,” in Chung’s Cities in China (1999) 287. 
158 Lam Tao-chiu, “Panyu and Nanhai,” in Chung’s Cities in China (1999) 238. 
  Park - 79 
 79 
3.2 THE SHANGHAI NETWORK:  
Debunking Regional Growth Node Theory 
 
 Shanghai, China’s wealthiest city, is gifted with advantageous geographic 
location on the Chiangjiang Delta and a historical tradition of trade and foreign 
relations.   Although Shanghai only has 1.1 percent of China’s population and 0.1 
percent of its total area, it is estimated to contribute 20 to 25 percent of the central 
government’s revenues.159 As the largest city in China, and the fourth largest city in 
the world, Shanghai is a model example of the importance a single city can have in 
the national political and economic hierarchy.  Unlike Guangdong, Shanghai was 
originally deemed too important for central revenues to risk economic 
experimentation through preferential policy.  Deng Xiaoping later acknowledged that 
it was a major mistake to not designate Shanghai as a SEZ, a mistake Beijing tried to 
remedy by cordoning off the Pudong Development Sector in 1990 and 1992 to serve 
as the financial, industrial, and trading hub for the entire Changjiang Delta.160  By 
granting Shanghai preferential policy, Beijing signaled that Shanghai was to be the 
Changjiang River Valley’s new growth node.161  In a report given to the Fourteenth 
National Party Congress, Jiang Zemin stressed the need for the central government to 
develop Shanghai as an international economic, financial and trading center as soon 
                                                 
159 Jacobs and Hong (1994) Ibid. 226.   
160 Some of the literature on the Chanjiang Delta region still refer to its dated Wade-Giles spelling of 
Yangtze Delta or the pinyinized version of Changjiang.  They all refer to the same geographic area. 
161 In speeches given in 1990 and 1993, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin both called for Shanghai to 
take on a new role as an “outward-oriented, multi-function, modernized international city.” Bruce 
Jacobs and Lijian Hong, “Shanghai and the Lower Changjiang Valley,” in Goodman and Segal’s China 
Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 1994) 224. 
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as possible in order to promote economic growth in the Changjiang River Delta and 
the Changjiang River Valley.162   
 Shanghai was selected as a case study due to its status as a provincial-level 
municipality and its enduring tradition of urban agglomeration that existed since the 
late Qing period.  Unlike the Guangzhou urban network which is domestically 
contained within Guangdong, the city of Shanghai itself is located at the intersection 
of international and domestic spheres and is located in Zhejiang, close to Jiangsu 
while positioned close to the Korean Peninsula and Japan.  Because the city of 
Shanghai borders two other provinces, its reasons for developing inter-provincial 
linkages differs from both Guangzhou and Kunming.  It goes without saying that 
Shanghai has extensive foreign economic relations and is an integral urban center in 
the greater East Asian region.  I would rather use this space to briefly discuss 
Shanghai’s inter-provincial relations to show that quite contrary to being a regional 
growth node, spatial inequality is most apparent in the Changjiang River Delta.    
 
The Failure of the Shanghai Economic Region 
 
 In 1982, the National State Council established a Shanghai Economic 
Region than encompassed ten municipalities and fifty-seven counties that included 
parts of neighboring Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces.  The ten cities that were 
encapsulated in this centrally designated region were Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, 
Changzhou, Nantong, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Hangzhou, Ningbo, and Shaoxing, covering 
                                                 
162 David Goodman and Gerald Segal, China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism (New 
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74,000 square kilometers of territory and over 50 million people.163  This was later 
expanded in 1984 to include all of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Fujian in 
1986, expanding its size to a massive 637,000 square kilometers and a population of 
228 million.164  Governed by the State Economic Commission, despite initial success 
in coordinating transport projects around the Lake Tai area, it failed in directing 
development of the industrial sector.  Instead of complementary industrial 
development among localities, the region was mired by duplication and local 
protectionism until it was disbanded in the late 1980’s, less than ten years after its 
formation.  Jacobs and Hong (1994) attribute the failure of this integration project as 
an overall lack of human resources, poor transportation, weak infrastructure, and 
capital shortage.165  Yet human resources, infrastructure, and capital is what Shanghai 
has in abundance, certainly more than most other cities in China.  According to 
regional growth node theory, these factors should have spread to at least Shanghai’s 
neighboring areas.  
  
                                                 
163 Brian Hook, Shanghai and the Yangtze Delta: A City Reborn (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998) 79.   
164 J. Bruce Jacobs and Lijian Hong, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley,” in Goodman and Segal 
eds. China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade, and Regionalism (New York:Routledge, 1994) 240-245. 
165 Although plans to economically integrate the Changjiang River Valley have come across many 
obstacles, Jacobs and Hong report that an integrated regional economy emerging in a smaller area 
among the cities of Shanghai, Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, and the Shanghai-Hangzhou corridor in 
Zhejiang.  Jacobs and Hong (1994) Ibid. 243.   
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http://www.huayurealty.com/images/map_shanghai_region_02.jpg 
Figure 12: major transport links between urban centers 
 
 Shanghai was gifted with three Economic and Technological Development 
Zones of Minghang, Hongqiao, and Chaohejin. Minghang ETDZ is an industrial-
based zone for light industry, textiles, electronics, precise instruments, fine chemicals, 
and metal processing industries.  Hongqiao ETDZ is a tertiary industry zone for banks, 
trade centres, office and flats, hotels, commercial plazas, and foreign consulates, 
while Chaohejin ETDZ is a high technology area.166  Along with Pudong, Shanghai 
had clear advantages over neighboring areas in terms of attracting investment in light, 
heavy, and tertiary industries.  These advantages are what made Shanghai so 
prosperous, but this has only contributed to a continuing process of polarization.   
 
                                                 
166  Anthony Gar-oh Yeh, Foreign Investment and Urban Development in China, 55. 
  Park - 83 
 83 
 
Figure 13: Industrial Agglomeration and Transport Linkages in the Changjiang River Delta from 
Maurice Howard’s “Industry, energy and transport: problems and policies,” in Cannon’s Geography 
of Contemporary China (1990) 185. 
   
 The economic geography of the Changjiang River Delta and neighboring 
Jiangsu province poignantly show industrial agglomeration and major transport 
infrastructure linking urban centers.  Jiangsu largely neglected urban development 
and transport infrastructure development during the reform era due to its 
concentration on remitting substantial income to the central government, and as a 
result focused on linking what it determined to be the most important cities at the 
expense of underdeveloped areas.  Whereas Jiangsu’s provincial government gave its 
two open coastal cities of Nantong and Zhangjiagang RMB 20 million from 1986 to 
1989 for development, Guangdong invested an incomparable RMB 150 million in 
Guangzhou alone.167  As a result, within Jiangsu, internal economic disparity is 
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immense as cities such as Suzhou and Wuxi boast per capita GDP over twice the 
amount of the provincial average.  Even though the Changjiang Delta region is a 
hotbed for FDI, with Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu accounting for approximately 
20 percent of all FDI in China,168 the wealthy cities in these areas are poorly linked 
with peripheral cities and only have adequate transport infrastructure to link key cities.  
It is no coincidence that the richest area in China also has the greatest spatial 
inequality.   In the case of Zhangjiagang, a county-cum-county level city during the 
reform era located on the Delta near Shanghai, Zhangjiagang was the poorest county 
in the Suzhou Municipality in 1978.  The local government viciously promoted their 
township-village enterprises (TVEs) and pursued a strategy for export-led growth.  
The local government actively pursued cultivating foreign linkages in global 
communication, transactions, and investment while defying provincial attempts to 
interfere with its growth strategy.169  Rather than tie its growth to Shanghai or other 
growth nodes, Zhangjiagang pursued an independent strategy of direct integration 
with the global economy.   
 Like Guangzhou, Shanghai is a “migrant” city, but unlike Guangzhou, there 
are much fewer emigrants to leave the Changjiang River Delta area than Guangzhou 
and the Pearl River Delta area.170  Population statistics show that in 1970, population 
outflows from the city far exceeded inflows.  Compared to 58, 527 people moving to 
Shanghai, a staggering 370,955 exited, for a net population decrease of about 3 
                                                 
168 This percentage is calculated from the 2003 FDI figures for each province listed in Tai-Yuen Hon, 
Che-Cheong Poon, and Kai-Yin Woo’s “Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment in China,” 
The Chinese Economy, 38.2 (2005). 
169 One example is the Jiangsu provincial government’s plans to build a second-level city in 
Zhangjiagang’s harbor were scrapped by fierce local government opposition.  Zweig (1999) Ibid. 218-
220.  
170 Lee Wing On and Brian Hook, “Human Resources,” in Hook’s, Shanghai and the Yangtze Delta 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1998) 125. 
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percent.  By 1985, after economic reforms started taking effect in Shanghai, although 
the inflow into the city dramatically increased to 182,904 for that year, outflow was a 
much lower at 129,973.  In 1994 this trend has continued, with 199,600 people 
moving to Shanghai but only 125,400 leaving the city.171  White (1996) attributes the 
pre-reform high outflow rates to high demand for skilled Shanghai labor to mainly 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu, but greater population inflows during the reform era point to a 
tendency for labor to increasingly migrate and settle in the city.  Studies of migrant 
populations show that in Shanghai, nearly 30 percent of registered migrants have 
completed higher education and have had, on average, 11.39 years of education.  If 
we compare this to the population of Shanghai, where only about 7 percent have 
completed higher education, we can see a clear bias in the type of migrants that are 
granted registration by the city government.172  Decreasing population outflows and 
the adoption of skilled migrants shows that over the past twenty years Shanghai has 
started to not only attract but retain skilled labor.  The proportion of skilled labor that 
Shanghai exports to the Changjiang Delta region has significantly decreased, 
challenging the central government’s plans for Shanghai to be a regional growth node. 
  
                                                 
171 It should also be noted that there was sizeable illegal migration that is not represented in these 
figures taken from Lynn White III, “Shanghai’s ‘Horizontal Liasons’ and Population Control,” in Y.M. 
Yeung and Y.M. Sung’s Shanghai: Transformation and Modernisation under China’s Open Policy 
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996) 425-432. 
172 Conversely, less than 3 percent of unregistered migrants have completed higher education.  
Statistics taken from Zhou Zhugen, “A Study of Migrant Population in Big Cities,” in Shanghai City 
Census, Shanghai Population in the Nineties. 
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3.3  THE KUNMING NETWORK: 
Linking Microregion with Subregion 
 
 
Figure 14: Yunnan’s transnational linkages in the Mekong Subregion 
 
Cook (2000) points out that all nine provinces with a utilized FDI of more 
than US$1 billion are all coastal, and all of those with utilized FDI less than $300 
million are interior provinces.  Kunming is an example of urban networks 
transcending coastal versus interior bifurcation that was a major analytic weakness of 
the Regional Analysis Framework discussed in the first chapter.  Unlike Guangdong 
and Shanghai, Yunnan did not receive preferential policy from Beijing.  Kunming’s 
landlocked status forced local governments to actively pursue transnational and inter-
provincial linkages, much more than Guangdong and Shanghai.  Since more than 76 
percent of industrial output in Yunnan comes from state-owned enterprises.173  As 
Yunnan’s economy is heavily dependent on SOE’s, economic growth is crucial for 
promoting social stability. 
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Of my three case studies, the Kunming Urban Network lacks coastal 
advantage, is landlocked, and is not geographically favored to take part in East Asian 
growth triangles and investment corridors.  Located in Yunnan Province in Southwest 
China, the Kunming urban network provides a different kind of transnational linkage 
from the Guangzhou urban network.  The old Chinese adage of “the mountains are 
high and the emperor far away” (shan gao huangdi yuan) is particularly pertinent to 
Yunnan in both its geographic setting and relatively less central government 
regulation compared to Shanghai or even Guangzhou.  84 percent of the province is 
mountainous, 10 percent plateau, and only 6 percent is arable basin.  Due to 
unfavorable and restricting geography, it would not be until airline links and 
advanced railroad construction that Yunnan would begin to integrate with its 
neighbors.174  Domestically, Yunnan in contiguous with Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan, 
and Tibet while sharing international borders with Burma, Laos, and Vietnam.  In 
order to compensate for unfavorable geographic location and the resultant lack of 
investment capital, Yunnan has been forced to take advantage of its numerous 
neighbors and develop inter-provincial and international linkages.  This landlocked 
province has therefore taken a precarious position in regionalism and it is still in the 
process of finding its niche in a larger global economy.  Regional integration projects 
are being actively pursued by two major bodies: the Asian Development Bank and the 
Kunming city government.  As the Greater Mekong Subregion is coordinated by the 
Asian Development Bank, the Kunming urban network is at the crossroads of micro-
region and sub-region.   
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 The last time Yunnan featured prominently in the central government’s plans 
was during Mao’s san xian (three front) campaign of interior development.  Back 
then, Yunnan profited from the center’s aversion for coastal growth, however, once 
war with the Soviet Union was ruled out and the san xian campaign was abandoned, 
there was little in terms of strategic value the province could offer the center until the 
1990’s.  The major change that has brought Yunnan back into the fray was China’s 
rapprochement with East Asia as discussed in the first chapter.  Unlike Guangdong 
province, Yunnan only has one major city that is undoubtedly the economic hub and 
political leader: Kunming.  Kunming exhibits complete centrality over the province 
and shows clear agglomeration of population, industry, and even tourism.  Kunming 
Hi-tech Industrial Zone, Kunming Economic and Technological Development Zone, 
were both ratified by the central government in 1992 and was the only city in Yunnan 
to be granted such preferential treatment.  In 1992, Kunming alone accounted for 40 
percent of the entire province’s industrial output.175  Even though it is the provincial 
capital, Kunming has its own Foreign Trade Commission separate from Yunnan’s, 
and the Kunming International Trust and Investment Corporation is owned by the city, 
not by the provincial government.  In the case of Yunnan, there is a clear institutional 
dichotomy between provincial and urban interests.  
In terms of inter-provincial cooperation, Yunnan is a member of the South-
west Cooperation Zone, an inter-provincial regional economic development zone that 
was founded in 1984 and includes Sichuan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Chengdu, Chongqing, 
and Tibet.  The Southwest Cooperation Zone is an example of provincial regionalism 
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by local actors in order to prevent further marginalization by the central government.  
The main purpose of this zone is to create a larger and more influential bloc to lobby 
the central government for preferential policy and investment.  Yet such cooperation 
has not led to increased integration; in fact, Kunming’s designation as the site for the 
annual border fair was a sore point for other members.   
Flourishing border trade has made transnational linkages far more important 
to Yunnan’s growth strategy than inter-provincial trade.  With the central government 
limiting investment for just a few key projects, the Yunnan government decided to 
target key industries such as tobacco and sugar for growth.176 Because Yunnan faces a 
harder budget constraint than Guangdong and Shanghai, Yunnan was heavily 
engaged in local protectionism in the early 1980’s.  The Yunnan economic plan of 
1981 even explicitly commanded buyers to only buy goods from local producers.177  
Yunnan’s local protectionist barriers and inability to secure capital from other 
provinces due to unfavorable investment conditions made it look outward to Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand for trade, years before Beijing established 
formal relations with many of these countries.  The informal nature of Yunnan’s 
transnational linkages is undeniable.  Well before economic reforms formally opened 
up border trade, there was a flourishing drug trade and smuggling rings in what Segal 
calls a “black Natural Economic Territory”178 between Yunnan and other Southeast 
Asian nations.    
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 Currently there is a regional attempt at realizing the natural economic territory 
of the Mekong River that flows through the lower subcontinent.  The Asian 
Development Bank, with the blessings of the national governments of all participating 
nations, designated the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) that is intended to 
establish cooperation in hydropower, transport and irrigation among all actors 
involved and develop the regional economy.  The Yunnan government is the only 
non-national government participating, with Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam all participatory countries.  Looking at investment patterns and transport 
infrastructure projects, it becomes clear that the purpose of including Yunnan is to 
integrate Kunming into the sub-regional economy.   
In terms of transport infrastructure, internally the goal throughout the 1990’s 
was to develop and improve rail links between Kunming, Nanning, and two seaports 
of Beihai and Fangcheng.   In terms of regional highways, the focus was on the 
Kunming-Daluo Road that links Yunnan with Burma and Thailand, as well as a road 
from Kunming to the Vietnamese city of Hekou.179  Major sub-regional projects in 
the transport sector are connecting Kunming with Chiang Rai in Thailand through 
both Myanmar and Laos, and the upgrading of the Kunming – Lashio roadway that 
links Yunnan with Myanmar.180  The main incentive for the Yunnan government is to 
link Kunming and Thailand.  The two economies are much more advanced than the 
other neighbors, yet regional cooperation is the only way to physically connect the 
two countries.  The Krung Thai Bank in Kunming that has been operating for eight 
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years and offers international banking services, facilitates Thai private sector 
investment in Yunnan, and efforts to improve economic links with Thailand is what 
drives Kunming’s participation in the Mekong Subregion.181   
 
http://www.maps-of-china.com/maps/yunnan-s-ow-600x600.gif 
Figure 15: Map of supra-provincial highway construction projects with Kunming as the hub 
 
The Mekong Subregion has greater implications, as it is predicted that 
Japanese companies will rotate the products in their global production networks in 
search of lower-cost production bases and eventually link with the Mekong sub-
region and position it within the greater East Asian regional economy.182  Therefore, 
despite its unfavorable geographic position that boasts no advantage like Guangzhou 
or Shanghai, Kunming has followed a strategy of linking with the greater sub-region 
in the eventual hope of accessing a wider East Asian economy.   
 Since its inception, however, the greatest obstacle to success has been Beijing.  
Economic cooperation is undermined by collective distrust from Burma, Laos, 
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam who harbor fears of China’s true intentions.  Active 
promotion and involvement by the Chinese central government has proven a major 
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stumbling block, despite increasing economic linkage between Kunming and these 
countries.  China’s intention of being a good neighbor is questioned due to historical 
enmity and its refusal to join the Mekong River Commission that oversees and 
coordinates projects.  Also, to the great dismay of Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Thailand, Beijing plans to build large dams on the border that will damage the 
ecology of the lower Mekong region.183 It is important to notice that in this case, 
although distrust limits the amount of formal cooperation between national 
governments, informal trade by local actors continues to flourish and remains the 




                                                 
183 Siriluk Masviriyakul, “Sino-Thai Strategic Economic Development in the Greater Mekong 
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4.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
   
 Based on the three case studies of Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Kunming we 
can draw several conclusions concerning informal urban networks.  In each case, 
informal urban networks have come into existence due to central government 
initiatives, but have prospered due to local agents.  It is clear that the central 
government has a role to play in beginning the process.  In Guangdong, central 
designations of SEZs and low fiscal remittances contributed to network formation 
among Guangzhou, the SEZs and offshore economies of Hong Kong and Macao.  In 
Shanghai, the designation of Pudong was a key factor in Shanghai’s recent economic 
growth, and in Yunnan, Beijing’s rapprochement with border countries and approval 
of sub-regional projects has led to the realization of a Mekong Subregion.  There is no 
one definitive model for informal urban networks but we can extrapolate several 
similar characteristics between them.  First, in relation to geographic location, all 
three cases are located in provinces that have what Womack and Zhao call petty and 
grand advantage.184  This is significant because it provides localities the choice 
between promoting inter-provincial and/or international linkages.  It grants them an 
invaluable bargaining position in international trade as gateways to the interior 
market.  For example, if Burma wants to develop trade with Sichuan, it must develop 
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linkages through Yunnan first.  However, while Womack and Zhao empirically prove 
that coastal provinces boast the least export dependence on inter-provincial trade 
because they have diverse trading relations with a large number of countries,185 the 
Kunming case modifies this by proving that coastal status is not a prerequisite for 
high reliance on foreign trade.  Rather than separating coastal from interior, 
geographic access to foreign countries seems to be a more appropriate explanation for 
transnational linkages.  It is also no coincidence that each case is located on a Delta or 
near an international body of water.  Besides the agricultural benefits that initially 
gave these areas growth advantages, due to water access these areas enjoy reduced 
freight transport costs.  In each case, local governments have created supportive, not 
predatory, environments for local enterprises that attract investment.  There is an 
understood embeddedness between local governments, enterprises, and labor.  When 
a locality is presented with a choice of focusing international or domestic linkages, it 
will make a rational decision based on the benefits and cost of each.   
 As the thesis has shown, as a micro-regional process, informal urban networks 
are a threat to central attempts to alleviate economic disparity because their growth is 
spatially biased.  Although informal urban networks have come into being through 
central government policies, their growth and network formation is a local process 
that hinders inter-provincial economic integration.  Although theoretically, the central 
government still exerts subtle control through the nomenklatura system of 
appointments and the supply of preferential policy, decreasing trends of cadre rotation 
means that local leaders are becoming more and more entrenched and vested in local, 
parochial interests. The declining exercise of nomenklatura power of transferring 
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provincial leaders horizontally means that more and more provincial leaders are 
natives of their province of appointment or have worked extensively in that 
province.186  The system was enacted to make local elites more responsive to central 
directives, but waning central use of this power is making it obsolete as a method of 
control.   
 The danger is the rising social cost to the central government.  The 
Himmelman (1996) collaboration continuum shows that city collaboration begins as 
informal networks that gradually strengthen to collaboration.187  While this may seem 
desirable, the process of network formation is in itself spatially confining.  To clarify, 
because networks repay their initial cost through repeated use, it is in the interests of 
urban centers to use and develop them as much as possible.  For these networks to 
expand, the incentive of greater economic returns must exist.    
   
4.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 At first glance the disadvantages with informal urban networks is not 
immediately clear.  After all, areas like the Pearl River Delta and Changjiang River 
Delta are registering growth rates above the national average and have become crucial 
economic centers in East Asia.  It is also quite clear that national disintegration and 
political federalism are no longer considered real dangers to central control.188 Pew 
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Research Polls of urban areas show overwhelming support for Beijing’s ability to 
deliver economic growth, and high growth rates in these areas will only strengthen 
Beijing’s legitimacy, not undermine it.  The problem is not the rapid development and 
expansion of urban networks but Beijing’s commitment to balanced economic growth 
as outlined in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).  The unfortunate reality is that 
informal urban networks prevent the realization of regional growth nodes as a viable 
strategy for widespread economic growth.  Instead, we see a trend of polarization, 
spatial economic concentration, industrial agglomeration, and intra-provincial 
disparity.  If this is happening in areas gifted with favorable geography and 
traditionally wealthy provinces, it is difficult to conceive that they will promote 
growth on a national scale.   
 The solution is not duplicating the coastal development strategy of the 1980’s 
and exporting it to the interior regions.  Returning to the market explanation for 
economic fragmentation, a better strategy would be changing the incentives for 
regional cooperation.  In the case of informal urban networks, when we compare local 
incentives for inter-provincial trade versus international trade, we see that the 
temptation to look outward outweighs the potential benefits of domestic cooperation.  
To put it another way, the profit from foreign economic integration greatly exceeds 
the profit from domestic integration.  China’s coastal cities are in an exclusive 
position between domestic and international economies, and unlike interior areas, 
control access to China’s comparative advantage in the global market.  In the case of 
landlocked Yunnan, there are serious local attempts to access this global market by 
developing transport infrastructure in the Mekong sub-region.  What the central 
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government must do to encourage integration is to provide sufficient incentives for 
localities to actively pursue it.  Informal urban networks are threats to central control 
as local, bottom-up processes that are governed by local actors.  They are not, 
however, autonomous from the central government.  Beijing’s semi-successful 
campaign curbing local protectionism in 1991 shows that economic reforms have 
weakened but not severed its directive capacity over localities.189  
       Currently, the preferred form of central investment is for transport and 
infrastructure development.  The logic behind this is plausible: by developing these 
sectors, these areas become more attractive and therefore competitive sites of 
investment.  By making poorer regions a more attractive investment prospect in order 
to give them leverage against much more developed areas, however, is only a 
cosmetic makeover.  Top-down directives to encourage economic cooperation will 
only lead to bottom-up strategies to impede or manipulate such integration policies as 
a counterforce.  Economic integration should follow market logic: supply will meet 
demand.  But demand must begin with local actors.  In the case of informal urban 
networks, demand for economic integration is particularly lacking because of weak 
incentives to engage in inter-provincial trade over foreign trade.              
 The broad strategy the central government should pursue is industrial 
investment projects encouraging regional specialization.  Before transport and 
infrastructure development becomes the primary investment target, China must first 
break down the vestiges of the cellular economy that fragmented the market in the 
1980s.  Despite a relatively successful widespread and popular campaigns to curb 
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local protectionism, China is still dealing with its legacy.  Furthermore, Beijing 
should aim to provide regional economic stability to support foreign linkages over 
bilateral relations.  The financial crisis of 1997, for instance, severely hampered the 
development plans of the Mekong Subregion.  This is different from a unilateral 
approach since it circumvents resentment and hostility many of China’s neighbors 
have toward the central government. 
 
4.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS:  
CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT 
  
 As my treatment of informal urban networks was meant to be explanatory and 
not extensive, future research should consider using my analytic framework for 
mapping informal urban networks according to spatial concentration.  There is much 
that can be done in terms of quantifying the economic relationship and linkages 
between these cities and comparing different forms of urban networks.    
 The central government will have to decide how seriously it is committed to 
mitigating regional inequality.  Previously, Beijing has treated the subject with 
concern yet without sustained efforts.  The “Go West” policy must take priority if any 
real gains are to be achieved.  As I have argued, the key is not forcing provinces into 
cooperative arrangements that ignore spatial constraints but to address the incentives 
of local actors.  Cutting the Gordian knot of spatial development and disparity will 
take much more than a single masterstroke; but rather a complete structural change of 
incentives for the actors involved.  Within China’s long tension between central and 
local relations, there has always been the saying that, “whenever there are policies 
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from the top, the bottom produces counterstrategies.”  If Beijing is to overcome 
regional barriers to integration, it should consider a simple inversion to this saying.  
Instead of directing formal integration projects, the center should let the bottom 
choose its own path of economic development and focus on coordinating an 
appropriate counterstrategy to meet its own goals.     
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